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Judge Rakoff: “Do you admit the allegations?” 
Lawyer for defendant, Citigroup Global Markets: “We do not admit 
the allegations, your Honor. But if it’s any consolation, we do not deny 
them.”1 
  INTRODUCTION   
Opening fake accounts, secretly moving customer money, 
begging friends and family to open “ghost” accounts—these 
were all ways that Wells Fargo employees reportedly met ag-
gressive sales quotas.2 “We were constantly told we would end 
up working for McDonald’s,” a former Wells Fargo employee 
told the Los Angeles Times when the story broke.3 “If we did 
not make the sales quotas . . . we had to stay for what felt like 
after-school detention.”4 Multiple civil authorities pursued the 
bank—the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), and the Los 
Angeles City Attorney’s Office.5 These state and federal author-
 
 1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc., 
827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 11 Civ. 7387 (JSR)), vacated, 
752 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 2. E. Scott Reckard, Wells Fargo’s Pressure-Cooker Sales Culture Comes 
at a Cost, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi 
-wells-fargo-sale-pressure-20131222-story.html; Press Release, Consumer Fi-
nancial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Fines 
Wells Fargo $100 Million for Widespread Illegal Practice of Secretly Opening 
Unauthorized Accounts” (Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/ 
about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-fines-wells-fargo 
-100-million-widespread-illegal-practice-secretly-opening-unauthorized 
-accounts. 
 3. Reckard, supra note 2. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, supra note 2 (stating that 
Wells Fargo will pay penalties to the OCC and the City and County of Los An-
geles). 
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ities ultimately resolved the matter in the way that most civil 
enforcement matters are resolved: by settlement. 
A key aspect of the settlement was whether the bank had 
to admit that it did something wrong. The Wells Fargo CEO 
testified before Congress: he was “deeply sorry,” although he 
also “want[ed] to make very clear that . . . [w]e never directed 
nor wanted our [team members] . . . to provide products and 
services to customers they did not want.”6 A full page adver-
tisement declared that Wells Fargo was “[m]oving forward to 
make things right.”7 Despite these very public statements, the 
agreement with the CFPB and others was entered “without 
admitting or denying the findings of facts and conclusions of 
law.”8 It was entered, Wells Fargo stipulated, “in the interest of 
compliance and resolution of the matter.”9 The agreement with 
the Los Angeles City Attorney’s Office provided that the 
agreement “shall not constitute any evidence of admission of 
fault or concession of liability by Wells Fargo, either express or 
implied.”10 Perhaps with an eye to collateral consequences (es-
pecially disqualification for certain business), the deal specified 
that the agreement did not amount to an admission of fact or 
liability “showing moral turpitude.”11 Headlines following this 
 
 6. An Examination of Wells Fargo’s Unauthorized Accounts and the Reg-
ulatory Response: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban 
Affairs, 114th Cong. 72 (2016) [hereinafter Wells Fargo Hearing] (statement of 
John Stumpf, Chairman & Chief Executive Officer, Wells Fargo & Company), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-114shrg23001/pdf/CHRG-114shrg23001 
.pdf; Jeff Cox, Wells Fargo CEO Stumpf Apologizes, Vows that Bank Will Do 
Better, CNBC (Sept. 20, 2016), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/09/20/wells-fargo-ceo 
-stumpf-takes-stand-before-senate-expected-to-apologize.html. 
 7. Adrianne Pasquarelli, Wells Fargo Ramps up Marketing in Push To 
Regain Trust, ADAGE (Oct. 14, 2016), http://adage.com/article/cmo-strategy/ 
wells-fargo-ramp-marketing/306303. 
 8. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 2016-CFPB-0015 (Consumer Fin. Prot. 
Bureau Sept. 4, 2016) (consent order), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/ 
documents/092016_cfpb_WFBconsentorder.pdf; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., AA-
EC-2016-67 (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Sept. 6, 2016) (consent 
order for a civil monetary penalty), https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news 
-releases/2016/nr-occ-2016-106a.pdf (“The Comptroller finds, and the Bank 
neither admits nor denies . . . .”). 
 9. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 2016-CFPB-0015 (Consumer Fin. Prot. 
Bureau Sept. 4, 2016) (stipulation and consent), https://s3.amazonaws.com/ 
files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/092016_cfpb_WFBstipulation.pdf. 
 10. [Proposed] Stipulated Final Judgment at 3, State v. Wells Fargo & 
Co., No. BC580778 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 1, 2016). The Los Angeles City At-
torney’s website indicates that this is the judgment that was entered. See Pro-
tecting Consumers—Wells Fargo, L.A. CITY ATT’Y, https://www.lacityattorney 
.org/allegations-against-wells-fargo (last visited Feb. 2, 2018). 
 11. [Proposed] Stipulated Final Judgment, supra note 10, at 13. 
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settlement declared that “Wells Fargo Offers Regrets, but 
Doesn’t Admit Misconduct.”12 
Do the regulators’ actions against Wells Fargo “hold it ac-
countable,” as the Comptroller of the Currency claimed in a 
congressional hearing?13 And, more particularly, what is the 
role of admissions of wrongdoing in civil settlements in holding 
settling enforcement targets accountable? The Wells Fargo set-
tlement is one example of the type of civil enforcement that 
raises the question at the heart of this article: Whether and 
when should administrative agencies require enforcement tar-
gets to admit wrongdoing when settling an enforcement matter 
with the agency?14 
Regulators, judges, and commentators describe agencies’ 
approaches to admissions with words like truth,15 wrongdo-
ing,16 guilt,17 culpability,18 responsibility,19 liability,20 confes-
 
 12. Michael Corkery, Wells Fargo Offers Regrets, but Doesn’t Admit Mis-
conduct, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/10/ 
business/dealbook/wells-fargo-apologizes-but-doesnt-admit-misconduct.html. 
 13. Wells Fargo Hearing, supra note 6, at 2 (statement of Thomas J. Cur-
ry, Comptroller, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency). 
 14. This Article uses the term “target” to describe any target of a civil en-
forcement action by an agency, regardless of whether it is technically a de-
fendant or a respondent or whether the proceeding takes place in court or in 
an administrative agency’s adjudicatory system. Also for convenience, the 
term “settlement” describes the agreement between the target and the agency 
that resolves the enforcement matter. These agreements may be in the form of 
“consent decrees,” “consent judgments,” or “consent orders.” 
 15. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011), vacated, 752 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 2014) (raising concerns over lack of ad-
missions because the “public is deprived of ever knowing the truth”). 
 16. Corkery, supra note 12; Matt Taibbi, SEC: Taking on Big Firms Is 
“Tempting,” but We Prefer Picking on Little Guys, ROLLING STONE (May 30, 
2012), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/sec-taking-on-big-firms-is 
-tempting-but-we-prefer-whaling-on-little-guys-20120530 (decrying SEC set-
tlements in which companies failed to “admit wrongdoing”). 
 17. Carmen Germaine, SEC’s Thinking Still a Mystery After Merrill 
Lynch Megadeal, LAW360 (June 23, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/ 
810453/sec-s-thinking-still-a-mystery-after-merrill-lynch-megadeal (pointing 
out that it is “unclear exactly how the agency decides to seek an admission of 
guilt”). 
 18. Gretchen Morgenson, S.E.C. Wants the Sinners To Own Up, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 14, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/15/business/sec 
-wants-the-sinners-to-own-up.html (pointing to “admissions of culpability” in 
only eighteen cases in two years). 
 19. Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Deploying the Full En-
forcement Arsenal, Remarks at the Council of Institutional Investors Fall Con-
ference (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/ 
1370539841202 (“[T]here are certain other cases . . . where there is a special 
need for public accountability and acceptance of responsibility.”). 
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sion,21 and apology.22 One newspaper headline went so far as to 
describe agencies that require admissions as wanting “sinners 
to own up.”23 Regulators talk about admissions by enforcement 
targets as a matter of “public accountability and acceptance of 
responsibility.”24 This Article looks behind this rhetoric to give 
important—and previously missing—content to these claims 
about the function of admissions and their relationship to an-
nounced regulatory goals. Building on studies of the legal func-
tions and effects of apologies,25 we draw on empirical research 
examining the psychology of blame, responsibility, and ac-
countability to analyze the function and potential value of ad-
missions by targets of civil enforcement. 
In doing so, we provide a nuanced account of what it means 
to make and require admissions. First, although the policy 
choice is often portrayed as binary—either an agency requires 
admissions or it does not—the reality is more varied. An agency 
can establish a policy in which only some matters are settled 
with an admission of wrongdoing. In that context, the regula-
tors’ task is to identify when to require admissions. In each 
case, regulators-as-negotiators must decide whether, how, and 
to what extent admissions will serve the aims of the agency. In 
 
 20. Samuel W. Buell, Liability and Admissions of Wrongdoing in Public 
Enforcement of Law, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 505, 506–08 (2013). 
 21. Lynndon Groff, Note, Is Too Big to Fail Too Big to Confess: Scrutiniz-
ing the SEC’s “No-Admit” Consent Judgment Proposals, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1727, 
1727 (2013) (explaining that “the [SEC’s] standard settlement terms” do not 
require companies “to confess to wrongdoing”); see also Andrew Tangel & Jim 
Puzzanghera, SEC’s Mary Jo White Wants Companies to Fess Up, L.A. TIMES 
(Jan. 1, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/jan/01/business/la-fi-sec-white 
-20140102. 
 22. John Rothchild, How to Say You’re Sorry, TIME, June 20, 1994, at 51 
(criticizing companies’ refusals to apologize for financial misconduct); see also 
Marc S. Raspanti et al., The SEC’s New Admissions Policy Means Sometimes 
Having to Say You’re Sorry, 39 CHAMPION 16, 16 (2015). 
 23. Morgenson, supra note 18. 
 24. White, supra note 19; see also Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, Chairman’s Address at SEC Speaks 2014 (Feb. 21, 2014) [hereinafter 
White, SEC Speaks], https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2014-spch022114mjw#_ 
ftnref14 (“[A]dmissions are important because they achieve a greater measure 
of public accountability, which, in turn, can bolster the public’s confidence in 
the strength and credibility of law enforcement, and the safety of our mar-
kets.”). 
 25. See, e.g., Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An 
Empirical Examination, 102 MICH. L. REV. 460 (2003) [hereinafter Robben-
nolt, Legal Settlement]; Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Settlement Lev-
ers, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 333 (2006) [hereinafter Robbennolt, Settle-
ment Levers]. 
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doing so, regulators must consider the strength of the case 
against the target of enforcement and the nature of the allega-
tions. 
Second, regulators must consider the content of the admis-
sions sought or required. Commentators, regulators, judges, 
and journalists often refer to admissions of guilt or wrongdoing. 
But what does that mean? Admitting facts? Taking responsibil-
ity? Admitting to having intentionally engaged in particular 
behavior or wrongdoing? Admitting having violated the law? 
Regulators might require admissions in each of these senses. 
Or they might pick and choose. With this in mind, we delineate 
several different categories of admission based on insights from 
the empirical literature and on concrete examples drawn from 
the experience of administrative agencies. 
The experience of one agency—the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC)—serves as a central case study. The 
SEC provides a rich example of the debate over whether to re-
quire settling targets to admit wrongdoing because the agency’s 
policy about requiring admissions has changed over time in re-
sponse (in part) to a public debate over the function of admit-
ting wrongdoing.26 
That said, however, our observations are aimed not just at 
the SEC, but are directed more broadly at civil enforcement 
across agencies. In addition to the SEC, we draw on examples 
from other financial regulators, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the De-
partment of Justice’s (DOJ) Civil Division, the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC), and other agencies. Some 
agencies have formal policies that state whether and under 
what circumstances they will require admissions. But others 
simply go about the business of enforcement without a formal 
policy defining their approach to admissions. The resulting set-
tlements, then, provide case-by-case examples of the agency’s 
admissions practices. Regardless of whether agencies have 
formal policies on admissions, they generally rely heavily on 
settlement as a key tool of administrative enforcement. Wheth-
er or not an agency requires admissions interacts with the will-
ingness of targets to settle. And, admissions—or, more com-
monly, declarations that nothing is admitted—form part of the 
resulting settlement agreements. Whereas much of the existing 
literature about admissions in agency enforcement focuses on 
 
 26. See infra Part III. 
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admissions in SEC settlements, especially the potential collat-
eral consequences of such admissions, this Article uses the ex-
plicit debate over the SEC’s practices to draw attention to the 
high (and mostly unexamined) stakes for enforcement through-
out the administrative system. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the context 
within which we consider admissions of wrongdoing: civil en-
forcement by administrative agencies. As this Part explains, 
settlement is the main mode of resolving enforcement actions 
for many agencies. Admissions are focal in this context because 
resolution through settlement lacks the determination of facts 
or liability that an adjudicative proceeding would provide. This 
Part concludes by outlining some of the consequences of an 
agency’s choice about whether to require admissions. Part II 
examines what it means to “admit wrongdoing” in the context 
of civil enforcement. It analyzes the interaction between admis-
sions and denials of wrongdoing. It then asks what precisely is 
being admitted: Facts? Legal violation? State of mind? These 
models are then given concrete expression in Part III, which 
turns to the case study of the SEC’s admission practices. Part 
IV addresses the function and value of admissions and consid-
ers the implications of these functions for agencies negotiating 
admissions and the content of those admissions in enforcement 
actions. 
I.  THE CONTEXT OF CIVIL ENFORCEMENT   
A. AGENCY ENFORCEMENT 
Whether to require enforcement targets to make admis-
sions is a policy decision for many agencies that have civil en-
forcement authority.27 To understand the context in which this 
decision arises and the scope of our analysis, this Section first 
examines what is meant by civil enforcement, and then turns to 
the question of which agencies are included in our analysis. 
We are concerned here with admissions in the context of 
civil, rather than criminal, enforcement. As used here, the term 
civil enforcement encompasses both judicial actions and actions 
within an administrative agency, often before an administra-
tive law judge. Civil here is defined pragmatically: civil agen-
 
 27. Although agencies may adopt a uniform policy or decide whether to 
demand admissions on a case-by-case basis, this Article sometimes uses the 
phrase “admissions policy” or “admissions model” as shorthand for an agency’s 
decisions about requiring admissions in settlements with enforcement targets. 
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cies and civil enforcement are primarily distinguished by the 
remedies that may be sought.28 For instance, the SEC and the 
DOJ’s Criminal Division enforce the same insider trading stat-
ute, but the civil enforcement authority—the SEC—has no 
power to send anyone to jail. The agencies themselves provide 
good illustrations of how these lines are drawn in practice. The 
FTC, for example, describes the difference between civil and 
criminal actions in terms of remedies and whether there is evi-
dence of the target’s intention.29 “The FTC’s civil enforcement 
actions shut down fraud and get restitution for consumers or 
disgorgement.”30 The agency “partners with the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice, U.S. Attorneys, and other federal and state 
criminal law enforcers” when it develops “evidence that proves 
these defendants knew about the fraud” that could give rise to 
a criminal fraud prosecution.31 
Although our focus is on civil proceedings and regulators, 
criminal enforcement provides an important foil. In particular, 
criminal proceedings are the core example of a context in which 
defendants routinely must admit their wrongdoing and respon-
sibility, even when a case is resolved through an agreement ra-
ther than adjudication.32 
Agencies vary in structure, legal framework, and other as-
pects of their work, but many agencies have an enforcement 
function that relies heavily on settlement and that accordingly 
implicates the decision whether to require admissions of 
wrongdoing as a term of settlement. Financial regulators pro-
vide one set of examples. Not only do these agencies have goals 
and practices in common, but their settlement practices were 
 
 28. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections 
on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 
193, 193–94 (1991) (pointing to “the disappearance of any clearly definable 
line between civil and criminal law,” and arguing that “implementation of the 
crime/tort distinction is today feasible only at the sentencing stage”); Kenneth 
Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and 
Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1796 (1992). 
 29. Criminal Liaison Unit, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/ 
enforcement/criminal-liaison-unit (last visited Feb. 2, 2018). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values 
and Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 
CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1379 (2003) (identifying several reasons why prosecu-
tors and judges may oppose guilty pleas that do not include admission of 
wrongdoing (nolo pleas)); Buell, supra note 20, at 506–08 (2013) (explaining 
that defendants are allowed to enter nolo pleas only in “the most unusual cir-
cumstances”); see also sources cited infra note 85. 
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collectively in the spotlight after the 2007 financial crisis. A 
hearing in front of the House Financial Services Committee in 
2012 focused on financial agencies’ settlement practices in gen-
eral, and their admissions policies in particular.33 The testimo-
ny at that hearing made it clear that the SEC was not the only 
agency confronting this policy choice. Witnesses not only in-
cluded the Director of the SEC’s Enforcement Division, but also 
representatives of the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation (FDIC), and the OCC.34 All pointed to—
and were challenged on—their agency’s policy of allowing set-
tlement without admissions. The General Counsel for the Fed-
eral Reserve, for instance, observed that “[t]he vast majority of 
the Federal Reserve’s formal enforcement actions are resolved 
upon consent” and that “[t]he Federal Reserve typically sets out 
summary recitations of the relevant facts in whereas clauses.”35 
He noted, however, that “like our fellow banking regulators, it 
has not been our practice to require formal admissions of mis-
conduct.”36 
The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC), which regulates derivatives and other financial prod-
ucts, provides another example in the context of financial regu-
lation. Like the SEC, the CFTC’s policy of entering into settle-
ments without requiring admissions of responsibility has 
triggered discussion and criticism. In 2013, for instance, a 
CFTC Commissioner called for a policy change: “Admitting to 
these findings of fact needs to be something part and parcel to 
 
 33. Examining the Settlement Practices of U.S. Financial Regulators: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 122th Cong. (2012) [hereinafter 
Hearing on Settlement Practices], https://financialservices.house.gov/ 
uploadedfiles/112-128.pdf. 
 34. Id. at 1. 
 35. Id. at 7 (statement of Scott G. Alvarez, General Counsel, Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System). 
 36. Id.; see also id. at 10 (statement of Richard J. Osterman, Jr., Deputy 
General Counsel, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) (“The vast majority 
of our cases are resolved through stipulated settlements which achieve our 
statutory responsibilities and protect the public interest without admissions of 
liability.”); id. at 12 (statement of Daniel P. Stipano, Deputy Chief Counsel, 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency) (noting that “[i]n the vast majority 
of cases, OCC enforcement actions are resolved by consent” and that the asso-
ciated enforcement order “includes the Comptroller ’s findings supporting an 
action and a statement that the institution or individual neither admits nor 
denies wrongdoing”). 
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these types of settlements. All too often, a firm will neither ad-
mit nor deny any wrong doing [sic]. That needs to stop. . . .”37 
But the underlying question about when civil agencies 
should require admissions reaches well beyond financial regu-
lators. Administrative agencies rely heavily on settlement, ra-
ther than adjudication, in their enforcement functions, and part 
of what is or could be negotiated in settlement discussions is 
the extent to which the target will acknowledge responsibil-
ity.38 
The FTC and the EPA are examples of agencies that explic-
itly allow settlement without requiring parties who settle with 
the agency to admit their responsibility.39 The EPA rules of 
practice provide that consent agreements must state that the 
respondent “admits the facts stipulated in the consent agree-
ment or neither admits nor denies specific factual allegations 
contained in the complaint.”40 Following this policy, some EPA 
consent decrees include language indicating that the court’s or-
der was entered “without the adjudication or admission of any 
issues of fact or law.”41 The FTC’s rules permit consent agree-
ments to “state that the signing thereof is for settlement pur-
poses only and does not constitute an admission by any party 
that the law has been violated as alleged in the complaint.”42 
 
 37. Bart Chilton, Comm’r, U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n, 
Concurrence of Commissioner Bart Chilton in the Matter of JPMorgan Chase, 
N.A. (JPMorgan) (Oct. 16, 2013), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/ 
SpeechesTestimony/chiltonstatement101613; cf. Francine McKenna, PCAOB 
Extracts First Admission of Guilt from Public Company Audit Firm, MAR-
KETWATCH (Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/pcaob-extracts 
-first-admission-of-guilt-from-public-company-audit-firm-2015-10-02 (pointing 
to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s (PCAOB) new policy of 
requiring admissions of guilt). 
 38. See infra Part I.B. 
 39. Larissa Lee, Note, Admission of Guilt: Sinking Teeth into the SEC’s 
Sweetheart Deals, 3 J. MARSHALL GLOBAL MKTS. L.J. 27, 34 (2014) (noting 
that no-admit-no-deny policies characterize many agencies, including the FTC, 
the EPA, the Federal Reserve, the OCC, and the FDIC). 
 40. Environmental Protection Agency Consolidated Rules of Practice, 64 
Fed. Reg. 40,138, 40,183 (July 23, 1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
§ 22.18(b)(1)) (emphasis added). 
 41. See, e.g., Consent Decree, United States v. Enbridge Energy Ltd. 
P’ship, No. 1:16-cv-914 (W.D. Mich. May 23, 2017), https://www.epa.gov/sites/ 
production/files/2017-06/documents/enbridgeentered-cd_0.pdf; Consent Decree 
at 2, United States v. City of Gary, No. 2:16-cv-00512 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 12, 
2016), http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-12/documents/cityofgary 
-cd.pdf. 
 42. 16 C.F.R. § 2.32 (2017). 
 2018] ADMISSIONS OF GUILT 1087 
 
Other agencies explicitly permit settlement, but are silent 
about admissions.43 
The FCC provides an unusual example in that it explicit-
ly—and controversially—adopted a policy of seeking admis-
sions in 2014 when Travis LeBlanc became enforcement chief. 
In an early speech, LeBlanc called past consent decrees “a bit of 
a ‘boondoggle’ for the industry” because the targets “didn’t have 
to admit to anything.”44 The FCC’s policy change was contest-
ed, prompting predictions of a “showdown” with the “new sher-
iff.”45 
Finally, although our primary focus is on U.S. administra-
tive agencies, the questions we raise about admissions, our 
analysis of the range of admissions that might be made, and 
the role of admissions in negotiating civil settlements, reach 
beyond U.S. domestic agencies. A vivid illustration comes from 
Canada; in contrast to the SEC, securities authorities in Ontar-
io have moved from a policy of always requiring admissions to 
one that permits settlement without admission.46 
 
 43. Under the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act, the Department of Ed-
ucation, the Department of the Treasury, and the Department of Labor have 
promulgated procedures for settlement that do not mention or give any direc-
tion as to admissions. See 29 C.F.R. § 22.46 (2017); 31 C.F.R. § 16.46 (2017); 
34 C.F.R. § 33.46 (2017). 
 44. FCC Enforcement Chief Outlines New Focus: Consumers, Prevention, 
Efficiency, BLOOMBERG BNA (July 23, 2014), https://www.bna.com/fcc 
-enforcement-chief-n17179892750 (reporting LeBlanc’s 2014 remarks at a 
Federal Communications Bar Association lunch). 
 45. Margaret Harding McGill, FCC Enforcement Shifts Nearing Breaking 
Point with Industry, LAW360 (July 7, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/ 
675011/fcc-enforcement-shifts-nearing-breaking-point-with-industry (“Under 
the guidance of Chief Travis LeBlanc, the Enforcement Bureau’s more adver-
sarial approach to industry means bigger fines, admissions of liability and 
what some see as an attempt at policy-making through enforcement. And 
while the options for challenging the bureau are largely unappealing, attor-
neys say a showdown with the new sheriff feels almost inevitable.”). 
 46. Staff Notice, Ont. Sec. Comm’n., Request for Comments on Proposed 
Enforcement Initiatives (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/ 
en/Securities-Category1/sn_20111021_15-704_rfc-enforcement-initiatives.pdf. 
Most of the examples in this Article are drawn from federal agencies, but state 
agencies may face the same type of issue. One example comes from state anti-
trust authorities based in their respective attorney general’s offices. See Con-
sent Decree at 2, New York v. Herman Miller, Inc., No. 08-cv-02977 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 25, 2008), https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/pdfs/bureaus/antitrust/ 
Signed_FJ.pdf (“Without any admission or denial of liability or wrongdoing 
and to avoid the additional burden and expense of continued litigation, [de-
fendant] has consented [to settlement].”).  
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B. THE ROLE OF SETTLEMENT 
Questions of whether to require admissions arise in the 
context of negotiated settlements between the agency and the 
target of the enforcement action. When a case settles, there is 
no final adjudication of liability or of the facts by administra-
tive adjudication or by a court. At least in the SEC context, the 
matter is often settled at the same time it is filed, so there are 
no adjudicatory proceedings at all.47 The extent and type of 
admission to be made is part of the settlement negotiation. 
Three aspects of agency settlements are particularly relevant to 
the discussion about admissions. 
First, settlement between agencies and the targets of en-
forcement has long been an accepted tool of agencies in part be-
cause such agreements stretch scarce resources.48 Although 
settlement rates vary by agency and time period, many agen-
cies report settling the majority of their enforcement matters.49 
 
 47. STEPHEN CHOI ET AL., N.Y. UNIV. POLLACK CTR. FOR LAW & BUS. & 
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY AGAINST PUBLIC 
COMPANIES AND THEIR SUBSIDIARIES: FISCAL YEAR 2016 UPDATE 7 (2016), 
https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/SEC-Enforcement-Activity 
-Against-Public-Company-Defendants-2016 (reporting that ninety-seven per-
cent of SEC settlements with public companies in fiscal year 2016 were settled 
at the same time they were initiated and that the median was eighty-seven 
percent for fiscal years 2010–2015). 
 48. See Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Sec., Report of the Task Force on 
SEC Settlements, 47 BUS. LAW. 1083, 1092–93 (1992); ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF 
THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 24 (1979) (stating, ap-
provingly, that agencies “resolve the great majority of civil money penalty cas-
es without reaching the stage of formal administrative adjudication or a court 
collection proceeding”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL 
ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 48 (1947) (quoting DEAN ACHESON 
ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINIS-
TRATIVE PROCEDURE 35 (1941)) (noting that agency “settlement of cases and 
issues by informal methods is nothing new,” and “even where formal proceed-
ings are fully available, informal procedures constitute the vast bulk of admin-
istrative adjudication and are truly the lifeblood of the administrative pro-
cess”). 
 49. See, e.g., Hearing on Settlement Practices, supra note 33, at 10 (state-
ment of Richard J. Osterman, Jr., Deputy General Counsel, Federal Deposit 
Insurance Company) (“The vast majority of our cases [were] resolved through 
stipulated settlements.”); id. at 7 (statement of Scott G. Alvarez, General 
Counsel, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) (“The vast major-
ity of the Federal Reserve’s formal enforcement actions are resolved upon con-
sent.”). See generally Maimon Schwarzchild, Public Law by Private Bargain: 
Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 
1984 DUKE L.J. 887, 888 (describing consent decrees as “common in every va-
riety of lawsuit over public policy”). 
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Some of the same rationales given for favoring settlement 
in the U.S. legal system more generally are also invoked as 
reasons for agency enforcement settlements: efficiency and liti-
gant “buy in,” as well as conservation of judicial or other public 
resources.50 Other rationales are particular to the agency con-
text. For example, former SEC Chair Mary Jo White described 
the benefits of relying on settlements: they allowed the SEC to 
“get relief within the range of what we could reasonably expect 
to achieve after winning at trial” and “to eliminate all litigation 
risk, resolve the case, return money to victims more quickly, 
and preserve our enforcement resources to redeploy to do other 
investigations.”51 
Second, the terms of agency settlements are generally pub-
lic. Like the settlement of litigation between private parties, 
settlements between an agency and an enforcement target in-
volve aspects of contract.52 But unlike settlements between pri-
vate parties, the terms of the settlement are generally publicly 
known. In some administrative contexts, the “publicness” of 
these terms is formal. Consent orders are published in the Fed-
eral Register for public comment before being finalized.53 Agen-
cies are also sometimes required to issue a related press re-
lease.54 
 
 50. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Justice and Contract in Consent 
Judgments, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19, 25; Thomas M. Mengler, Consent Decree 
Paradigms: Models Without Meaning, 29 B.C. L. REV. 291, 327–32 (1988) (not-
ing that settlement conserves judicial and litigant time and resources, and 
that it allows for compromise, often without liability). 
 51. White, supra note 19. 
 52. See, e.g., SEC v. Levine, 881 F.2d 1165, 1178–79 (2d Cir. 1989) (“A 
consent judgment, though it is a judicial decree, is principally an agreement 
between the parties. Such judgments should be construed basically as con-
tracts, without reference to the legislation the Government originally sought 
to enforce but never proved applicable through litigation.” (quoting United 
States v. ITT Cont’l Banking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 236–37 (1975))). 
 53. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2012) (requiring that consent judgments 
with the United States under the antitrust laws be published in the Federal 
Register for notice and comment); 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (2012) (providing a public 
comment period when a consent decree is entered into in the context of Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability (CERCLA)); 
10 C.F.R. § 205.199J (2017) (“When a Consent Order has been signed, both by 
the person to whom it is issued and the DOE, the DOE will publish notice of 
such Consent Order in the Federal Register and in a press release to be issued 
simultaneously therewith.”); 16 C.F.R. § 2.34 (2017) (providing that the FTC 
will publish consent decrees). 
 54. 15 U.S.C. § 16(c) (requiring the agency to publish summaries of anti-
trust consent decrees in a newspaper); 10 C.F.R. § 205.199J (requiring the 
DOE to issue a simultaneous press release). 
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Even when these consent decrees are not formally pub-
lished, the agency often announces in a press release or other 
public release that a matter has been settled.55 Settlement 
terms may be publicly available on the agency webpage, with 
links to the underlying documents, or summarized in a press 
release or other short report.56 Even before they became widely 
available on the Internet, press releases and litigation releases 
announced agency settlements with some detail. Although an-
ecdotal, it is easy to identify newspaper articles about high pro-
file or locally important cases that describe the terms of settle-
ment, including whether the target made any admissions.  
For example, an article on an SEC settlement with the 
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey reported that the 
SEC “secur[ed] a rare admission of wrongdoing.”57 The SEC’s 
settlements with a variety of targets—building suppliers who 
allegedly prevented employee whistleblowing,58 disgraced 
mayors,59 and turnaround specialists60—were all reported in 
 
 55. See, e.g., The City of West Haven, Connecticut Clean Water Act Settle-
ment, EPA (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/city-west-haven 
-connecticut-clean-water-act-settlement; AJN Investments, LLC, SEC Litiga-
tion Release No. 23714, (Dec. 28, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/ 
litreleases/2016/lr23714.htm. 
 56. See, e.g., Cases and Proceedings, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/ 
enforcement/cases-proceedings (last updated Dec. 6, 2017); Civil Cases and 
Settlements, EPA, https://cfpub.epa.gov/enforcement/cases (last updated Dec. 
5, 2017); Litigation Releases, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases 
.shtml (last updated Dec. 7, 2017). 
 57. Paul Berger, SEC Announces $400,000 Settlement of Probe, ASBURY 
PARK PRESS, Jan. 11, 2017, at A14; see also Elizabeth Lazarowitz, Whale of a 
Hit Morgan To Pay $920M for Fiasco, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 20, 2013, at 28; 
Bobby Yip, Merrill Lynch to Pay $415 Million for Misusing Customer Cash, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (June 24, 2016), http://www.stltoday.com/business/ 
local/merrill-lynch-to-pay-million-for-misusing-customer-cash/article_ce2d6ca1 
-b0f2-547a-b338-369d628c1816.html (noting that Merrill Lynch “admit[ted] to 
wrongdoing to settle charges that it misused customer cash”). 
 58. Russell Grantham, BlueLinx Settles Whistleblower Case SEC Accused 
Atlanta Building Supply Firm of Trying to Stifle Exiting Workers From Alleg-
ing Wrongdoing, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 12, 2016, at A9 (reporting that the 
enforcement target agreed to pay a $265,000 penalty to the SEC “but didn’t 
admit or deny the allegation”). 
 59. See Kaitlin L. Lange, Ex-Fort Mitchell Mayor has Law License Sus-
pended, CIN. ENQUIRER, Dec. 20, 2016, at A5 (reporting that a disgraced 
mayor agreed to a settlement “which was neither an admission or denial of the 
SEC’s charges”); Ashlee Rezin, Harvey Mayor Fined $10K for ‘Fraudu-
lent Bond Offerings’, CHI. SUN TIMES (May 19, 2016), https://chicago 
.suntimes.com/news/harvey-mayor-fined-10k-for-fraudulent-bond-offereings 
(reporting that the mayor “did not admit to any wrongdoing”). 
 60. Thomas Heath, Chevy Chase Turnaround Specialist Agrees to Pay $3.1 
Million to Settle SEC Charges, WASH. POST (June 2, 2016), https://www 
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articles that included the detail that the target did not admit 
wrongdoing. Accordingly, unlike in other contexts where set-
tlement terms are confidential, information about agency set-
tlements is available to the public in various forms. 
Third, because these agency settlements have public impli-
cations, they may be subject to judicial review. When an agency 
settles a court action, for instance, the settlement must be ap-
proved by a judge, who reviews it to determine whether it is 
“fair, reasonable, and adequate” and in many cases whether it 
is in the public interest.61 This judicial settlement review is 
particularly relevant to the development of the SEC’s approach 
to admissions. One of the triggers for changes in SEC policy 
about admissions was the refusal of a trial court judge, Judge 
Jed Rakoff of the Southern District of New York, to approve a 
settlement between the SEC and Citigroup.62 
C. CONSEQUENCES OF ADMISSIONS POLICY 
Whether an agency requires settling targets to make ad-
missions can affect the willingness of the targets of enforce-
ment to settle their cases. The practical consequences of admis-
sions for targets, therefore, have implications for the ability of 
agencies to settle cases. 
One of the primary concerns for targets of administrative 
enforcement is the effect that admissions will have on other le-
gal actions that reach the same underlying conduct.63 Private 
 
.washingtonpost.com/business/capitalbusiness/chevy-chase-turnaround 
-specialist-agrees-to-pay-31-million-to-settle-sec-charges/2016/06/02/b7904976 
-28fb-11e6-ae4a-3cdd5fe74204_story.html (reporting that “Blackstreet [Capi-
tal Management] admit[s] to no wrongdoing as part of the $3.1 million settle-
ment”). 
 61. See, e.g., SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc., 673 F.3d 158, 161–63 (2d 
Cir. 2012) (“The district court rejected the settlement, concluding that it was 
‘neither reasonable, nor fair, nor adequate, nor in the public interest.’”); SAM-
UEL J. WINER, CHRISTOPHER M. CUTLER & KENNETH B. WINER, SECURITIES 
ENFORCEMENT: COUNSELING AND DEFENSE § 17.07, (2017) (noting that the 
relevant federal district court must approve any settlements of a civil court 
case with the SEC). 
 62. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011), vacated, 752 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 2014). For further discussion of Judge 
Rakoff ’s decision, see infra Part III.B. 
 63. See, e.g., Joseph F. Guida & Jean M. Flores, From Here to a Penalty: 
Anatomy of EPA Civil Administrative Enforcement, 43 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 129, 
152 (2013) (noting that targets of EPA civil administrative enforcement may 
be reluctant to admit “allegations and conclusions of law because of potential 
legal implications outside of the immediate proceeding”); Paul Radvany, The 
SEC Adds a New Weapon: How Does the New Admission Requirement Change 
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litigation is an important category of parallel action. The 
mechanism by which admissions affect other legal actions 
might be one of preclusion: an admission may be used to pre-
vent relitigation of that factual issue in a separate suit.64 Or, 
the settlement with the regulator might be used as evidence in 
the parallel private litigation.65 
Targets may also be concerned about the effect of an ad-
mission that is made before one agency when they are being in-
vestigated by multiple agencies for the same conduct. This type 
of multiagency action has ample precedent. For example, when 
a London-based trader made a bet that caused a loss of six bil-
lion dollars—the so-called London Whale matter—J.P. Morgan 
not only admitted wrongdoing and settled with the SEC, but it 
also settled simultaneously with the U.K. Financial Conduct 
Authority, the Federal Reserve, and the OCC,66 and later with 
the CFTC.67 Thus, in considering the possibility of admissions 
in a negotiation with one agency, targets may well have to con-
sider the implications of those admissions across agency ac-
tions. 
The potential consequences may also go beyond the effects 
in related litigation or enforcement. Insurance coverage may be 
threatened by some admissions, as these policies generally do 
not cover fraud or intentional misconduct.68 As one law firm 
warned its clients, particular targets may face other conse-
quences: “Admitting securities fraud can seriously jeopardize 
contracts with government entities, state licenses to engage in 
financial services, surety bonds, the ability to engage in fiduci-
ary business, and many other things.”69 
 
the Landscape?, 15 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 665, 696–97 (2014); Jason E. 
Siegel, Note, Admit It! Corporate Admissions of Wrongdoing in SEC Settle-
ments: Evaluating Collateral Estoppel Effects, 103 GEO. L.J. 433, 442–43 
(2015). 
 64. See Siegel, supra note 63. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, JPMorgan Chase Agrees To 
Pay $200 Million and Admits Wrongdoing to Settle SEC Charges (Sept. 19, 
2013) [hereinafter JPMorgan Press Release], https://www.sec.gov/News/Press 
-release/2013-187. 
 67. Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Files 
and Settles Charges Against JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., for Violating Pro-
hibition on Manipulative Conduct in Connection with “London Whale” Swaps 
Trades (Oct. 16, 2013), http://cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6737-13. 
 68. The Future of Admitting When Settling SEC Enforcement Actions: 
Some Initial Considerations, JONES DAY (June 2013), http://www.jonesday 
.com/the-future-of-admitting-when-settling-sec-enforcement-actions. 
 69. Id. 
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Collateral consequences for targets have consequences for 
regulators. Collateral consequences, especially the potential 
use of the admission in private litigation, can influence the 
willingness of targets to settle and, correspondingly, the degree 
to which settlement is a prevalent and useful tool of the admin-
istrative agency.70 A lawyer for Citigroup warned (perhaps hy-
perbolically) that if admissions were required in SEC settle-
ments, “[t]he federal regulatory enforcement regime would 
screech to a grinding halt.”71 The General Counsel of the Fed-
eral Reserve made a similar, though more understated, point in 
congressional testimony: “Requiring admissions of guilt as a 
condition of entering into a consent action we believe would 
have a deleterious effect on our supervisory efforts by causing 
more institutions and individuals to contest the requested relief 
in formal administrative proceedings, which typically take 
years to reach resolution.”72 For similar reasons, former SEC 
Chair White called allowing no-admit-no-deny settlements “or-
dinarily, a significant win-win.”73 
The potential interaction between an admissions policy and 
the willingness of defendants to settle is also vividly illustrated 
by the contrast between the development of the SEC’s policy 
and one developed by securities authorities in Canada. While 
the SEC moved from a no-admit-no-deny regime to one in 
which the agency sometimes requires admissions,74 Canadian 
authorities moved in the other direction. Securities authorities 
in Ontario shifted from a policy of always requiring admissions 
to one that permits “no-contest settlements,” in which targets 
make no admission.75 Why? The Canadian authorities explicit-
ly pointed to their prior policy of requiring admissions as mak-
ing targets of enforcement overly reluctant to settle cases.76 
 
 70. See Buell, supra note 20, at 518. 
 71. Argument at 44, SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc., 673 F.3d 158 (2d 
Cir. 2012) (Nos. 11 CV 5227, 11 CV 5242, 11 CV 5375). 
 72. Hearing on Settlement Practices, supra note 33, at 7; see also id. at 10 
(statement of Richard J. Osterman, Jr., Deputy General Counsel, FDIC) 
(“[R]equiring a respondent to specifically admit the alleged conduct in a set-
tlement may have the unintended consequence of delaying prompt relief and 
corrective action.”). 
 73. White, supra note 19.  
 74. See id.  
 75. Staff Notice, supra note 46. 
 76. Philip Anisman, No-Contest Settlements and the SEC’s Recent Experi-
ence: Implications for Ontario, ONT. SEC. COMM’N (June 4, 2015), http://www 
.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/securities-category1/rpt_20130605_15-706_no 
-contest-settlements.pdf.  
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Observers of Canadian securities regulation have pointed out 
that such a requirement “greatly increases the time, human re-
sources, and amount of money that regulators must devote to a 
particular file.”77 
It is unclear to what extent concerns about the impact of 
admissions on the use and usefulness of settlement have mate-
rialized for targets. Courts have not fully resolved the reach of 
preclusion in this situation, or the extent to which evidence of 
admissions would be permitted in parallel litigation.78 The in-
tensity of collateral consequences also depends on the extent to 
which agency enforcers and private litigants target the same 
conduct.79 If the overlap is great, then litigants should be par-
ticularly concerned with collateral consequences. If the overlap 
is not as significant, then the effect of an admission in agency 
proceedings should not matter as much. 
Moreover, regulators may be able to shape admissions to 
reduce the concern about their use in private litigation. Indeed, 
this Article’s analysis of different admissions models80 high-
lights the ability of regulators to do just that: select among dif-
ferent types of admissions (of fact, legal violation, or state of 
mind) to calibrate the possible collateral consequences for the 
target and balance the various policy goals of the agency.81 In 
the context of securities enforcement, for instance, we see cases 
in which corporations admit that they violated a section of the 
securities laws that does not require a showing of scienter, 
leaving relatively unaffected later assertions of securities 
fraud, which do require a showing of scienter.82 
Having a clear sense of the collateral consequences of ad-
missions and the implications of those consequences for settle-
ment is important for agencies attempting to negotiate admis-
sions as part of a settlement. As we will see, combining this 
understanding with an appreciation of the potential value of 
 
 77. Poonam Puri, Securities Litigation and Enforcement: The Canadian 
Perspective, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 967, 981 (2012). 
 78. See Siegel, supra note 63, at 444–45. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See infra Part II. 
 81. See infra Part IV. 
 82. For example, in its London Whale settlement with the SEC, J.P. Mor-
gan did not admit to anything involving scienter. Instead, it admitted negli-
gence in internal controls, which could not be used in parallel private litiga-
tion. See Radvany, supra note 63, at 696–98; JPMorgan Chase & Co., No. 3-
15507 (Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Sept. 19, 2013) (order instituting cease-and-
desist proceedings), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2013/34-70458.pdf. 
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admissions for accomplishing the goals of both the agency and 
the target will even better equip regulators to set broad policies 
regarding admissions and to make decisions in particular cas-
es.83 
II.  ADMISSION MODELS   
The debate over whether agencies should require enforce-
ment targets to make admissions tends to be organized around 
two main options: requiring admissions or not requiring them. 
This approach reflects competing norms from two other con-
texts. The first norm underlies civil settlements between pri-
vate parties, in which admissions of liability would seem oddly 
out of place.84 The second norm comes from criminal prosecu-
tions, in which admissions (or adjudications) of wrongdoing are 
almost always required.85 Prosecutors and courts are concerned 
about the legitimacy of an action that is not based on a jury 
finding of culpability or a comparable set of admissions.86 Ac-
cordingly, the debate about admissions is, at least in part, a 
debate about the nature of administrative enforcement and the 
domain from which agency civil settlements should borrow. 
Although discussion of admissions in civil enforcement has 
been organized around these two models (“no admission” and 
“admission”), it is useful to break down the two categories to 
 
 83. See infra Part IV. 
 84. See, e.g., Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial 
Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1383 (1994) 
(“Settlements are often accompanied by exculpatory statements to the effect 
that no wrongdoing or liability is admitted.”). 
 85. Buell, supra note 20, at 506; Brandon L. Garrett, Corporate Confes-
sions, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 917, 921–22 (2008). For an empirical examination 
of different types of corporate criminal settlement agreements, see Cindy R. 
Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, The Evolution of Corporate Criminal Settle-
ments: An Empirical Perspective on Non-Prosecution, Deferred Prosecution, 
and Plea Agreements, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 537, 587 tbl.12 (2015) (“[O]ver 91% 
of DPAs and 79% of NPAs are found to require an agreement to the admissi-
bility of a statement of facts and prior testimony or statements, compared to 
38% of all plea agreements.”). For an empirical analysis of Alford, no contest, 
and guilty pleas for criminal defendants convicted of murder or manslaughter, 
see Allison D. Redlich & Asil Ali Özdoğru, Alford Pleas in the Age of Innocence, 
27 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 467 (2009); see also Brandon L. Garrett, Why Plea Bar-
gains Are Not Confessions, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1415, 1423–26 (2016) (not-
ing that “in the corporate prosecution setting, such detailed admissions are a 
commonplace aspect of plea agreements,” but arguing that in criminal law 
more generally plea bargains typically include admissions to acts constituting 
the elements of the crime, but do not typically include detailed admissions of 
wrongdoing). 
 86. Buell, supra note 20, at 508. 
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identify nuances within each. What is the interaction between 
admissions and denials of wrongdoing? What precisely is being 
admitted? Facts? Violation of a particular statute or rule? In-
tent? 
A. NO ADMISSION 
Take, as a starting point, the type of settlement that does 
not require the target to admit anything. The core example is 
the settlement of civil claims between private parties, which 
generally resolves a matter without any type of admission.87 
This lack of admissions may even be a specific part of the bar-
gain underlying these private civil settlements and is so com-
mon that it has been incorporated into standard form settle-
ment documents. For example, form settlement agreements for 
private parties include a clause providing for “No Admission of 
Liability.”88 Even in the class action context, where the settle-
ment is quasi-public in that it is subject to judicial review, a 
clause included in form documents with the heading “No Ad-
mission of Wrongdoing” specifies not only that defendants do 
not admit anything but also that defendants “expressly deny all 
charges of wrongdoing or liability.”89 
Perhaps because of this strong norm in the private context, 
agency settlements initially emerged without requiring admis-
sions of wrongdoing. Consent decrees first appeared as a way to 
resolve administrative actions in the context of civil antitrust 
 
 87. See Galanter & Cahill, supra note 84. 
 88. JEREMY A. MERCER & EVAN A. BLOCK, SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND 
RELEASE 3 (Practical Law Standard Document 2-503-1929, 2017) (“No Admis-
sion of Liability . . . . [P]ayment of the Settlement Payment is not, and may not 
be construed as, an admission of liability by [PARTY B] and is not to be con-
strued as an admission that [PARTY B] engaged in any wrongful, tortious, or 
unlawful activity. [PARTY B] specifically disclaims and denies (a) any liability 
to [PARTY A] and (b) engaging in any wrongful, tortious, or unlawful activi-
ty.”). 
 89. PRACTICAL LAW LITIG., CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 6 
(Practical Law Standard Document 6-608-2586, 2017) (“This Settlement 
Agreement shall not be construed or deemed to be evidence of an admission or 
concession on the part of any Defendant with respect to any claim, fault, liabil-
ity, wrongdoing or damage whatsoever. The Defendant(s) expressly deny all 
charges of wrongdoing or liability against them arising out of any of the con-
duct, statements, acts, or omissions alleged, or that could have been alleged, in 
the Class Action, and the Defendant(s) continue to believe the claims asserted 
against them in the Class Action are without merit. Notwithstanding these 
denials, the Defendant(s) have concluded that continuing to litigate the Class 
Action would be protracted and expensive and that, in light of its cost, risk, 
and uncertainty, it is desirable that the Class Action be fully and finally re-
leased as set forth in this Settlement Agreement.”). 
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enforcement.90 In one such consent decree from the 1920s, the 
targets explicitly disclaimed liability.91 They agreed to settle 
“upon condition that their consents to the entry of said decree 
shall not constitute or be considered an admission,” and that 
the decree “shall not constitute or be considered an adjudica-
tion that the defendants or any of them have in fact violated 
any law of the United States.”92 
At first glance, this no admission model simply permits 
settlement without any requirement that the enforcement tar-
get make any admissions. But the choice for regulators is more 
complicated. First, although no admission is required, it is use-
ful to consider what other information (for instance, factual al-
legations and penalty amounts) is available in the settlement 
and what messages that information conveys. Second, regula-
tors are faced with a policy decision about denial. Will they al-
low express denial, permit silence about denial, or require tar-
gets to specify that they do not deny the allegations? Examples 
of each approach can be found in administrative settlements. 
1. Factual Allegations 
Even settlements that are entered into without any admis-
sion of any kind are accompanied by detailed factual allega-
tions. Most SEC settlements, for example, provide that the tar-
get does not admit or deny the claims.93 Each of these 
settlements, however, is accompanied by a court order or com-
plaint that includes detailed factual allegations.94 Indeed, one 
of the triggers of the debate over whether the SEC should re-
quire admissions—the proposed settlement in SEC v. Citigroup 
Global Markets Inc.—included a provision that the bank did 
not admit or deny the allegations.95 The accompanying com-
plaint consisted, however, of twenty-one pages of detailed fac-
tual allegations.96 
 
 90. Schwarzchild, supra note 49, at 888 (“Consent decrees first became 
prominent in antitrust cases.”). 
 91. Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 320 (1928). 
 92. Id. 
 93. See infra Part III.D. 
 94. See, e.g., Complaint at 4, SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc., 827 F. 
Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 11 Civ. 7387 (JSR)) vacated, 752 F.3d 285 
(2d Cir. 2014), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp-pr2011 
-214.pdf. 
 95. See SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 96. See Complaint at 1–21, supra note 94.  
 1098 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:1077 
 
Other agencies have similar practices. One example is a 
Federal Reserve enforcement action against a bank for bribing 
foreign government officials by giving jobs to individuals the of-
ficials recommended.97 The settlement did not require formal 
admission of wrongdoing, but nonetheless recited the factual 
allegations in detail, including allegations about the central 
conduct that gave rise to the enforcement action.98 The agree-
ment provided, for example, that: 
  WHEREAS, from at least 2008 through 2013, [the target bank] 
operated a referral hiring program whereby candidates who were re-
ferred, directly or indirectly, by foreign government officials and exist-
ing or prospective commercial clients, and who in most instances were 
less qualified than non-referred candidates who were hired through 
the Firm’s standard hiring programs, were offered internships, train-
ing, and other employment opportunities in order to obtain improper 
business advantages for the Firm.99 
The former General Counsel of the Federal Reserve indicated 
that “set[ting] out summary recitations of the relevant facts in 
whereas clauses” was the agency’s common practice.100  
Some agencies have written requirements that information 
about the allegations be included in the formal settlement doc-
uments. For example, while the rules governing the Depart-
ment of Energy’s nuclear safety program provide that a consent 
 
 97. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Re-
serve Board Orders JPMorgan Chase & Co. to Pay $61.9 Million Civil Money 
Penalty (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
pressreleases/enforcement20161117a.htm (describing the action against the 
bank for “hiring individuals referred by foreign officials and other clients in 
order to obtain improper business advantages for the firm”). 
 98. See JPMorgan Chase & Co., No. 16-22-B-HC, 16-22-CMP-HC, 
2016 WL 7667933 (Fed. Reserve Nov. 17, 2016). The closest the consent order 
gets to referring to admissions of wrongdoing is this language: that the Board 
of Governors ordered the target bank  
before the filing of the notices, or taking of any testimony, or adjudi-
cation of or finding on any issues of fact or law herein, and solely for 
the purpose of settling this matter without a formal proceeding being 
filed and without the necessity for protracted or extended hearings or 
testimony . . . shall cease and desist and take affirmative action [as 
described]. 
Id. at *3. In 2012 testimony, then General Counsel for the Federal Reserve 
noted that its practice was not to require “formal admissions of misconduct.” 
See Hearing on Settlement Practices, supra note 33, at 7. 
 99. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 2016 WL 7667933, at *1. 
 100. Hearing on Settlement Practices, supra note 33, at 7. 
 2018] ADMISSIONS OF GUILT 1099 
 
order “need not constitute an admission” of a legal violation,101 
they do require recitations of fact and remedy.102 
Similarly, even where the enforcement target makes no 
admissions, information about the penalty agreed to, if any, is 
available as part of the settlement agreement. When the SEC’s 
policy of not requiring admissions came under fire, one of the 
agency’s defenses was that the fact of payment, particularly 
large payments, communicated wrongdoing.103 A typical SEC 
press or litigation release includes the penalty amount in the 
release and sometimes even in the headline: “Citadel Securities 
Paying $22 Million for Misleading Clients About Pricing 
Trades”104 or “Ernst & Young to Pay $11.8 Million for Audit 
Failures.”105 In both of these examples, the headlines an-
nounced both the penalty amount and the alleged wrongdoing, 
even though the matters were resolved without any admis-
sions.106 
In sum, even in the absence of an admission, some infor-
mation is available, often including detailed factual allegations 
and the amount of fines. There is clearly a legal difference be-
tween a target who makes an admission and one who does not. 
Many of the collateral consequences discussed above are trig-
gered only in the context of a formal admission.107 It is not 
clear, however, whether the nonlawyer public distinguishes be-
 
 101. 10 C.F.R. § 820.23 (2017). 
 102. Id. (requiring the consent order to “set forth the relevant facts which 
form the basis for the Order and what remedy, if any, is imposed”). 
 103. Transcript at 13, SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 
328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 11 Civ. 7387 (JSR)) vacated, 752 F.3d 285 (2d 
Cir. 2014). 
 104. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Citadel Securities Paying 
$22 Million for Misleading Clients About Pricing Trades (Jan. 13, 2017) [here-
inafter Citadel Press Release], https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2017 
-11.html; cf. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal 
Reserve Board Orders JPMorgan Chase & Co. to Pay $61.9 Million Civil Mon-
ey Penalty (Nov. 17, 2016), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
pressreleases/enforcement20161117a.htm (providing another example of head-
lines containing the penalty amount). 
 105. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Ernst & Young to Pay $11.8 
Million for Audit Failures (Oct. 18, 2016) [hereinafter Ernst & Young Press 
Release], https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-219.html. 
 106. Citadel Press Release, supra note 104 (“Without admitting or denying 
the findings, Citadel Securities agreed to be censured and pay $5.2 million in 
disgorgement of ill-gotten gains plus interest of more than $1.4 million and a 
penalty of $16 million.”); Ernst & Young Press Release, supra note 105 (noting 
that targets “consented to the SEC’s order without admitting or denying the 
findings”). 
 107. See supra Part I.C. 
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tween a complaint or consent decree that details the wrongdo-
ing, but does not include admissions, and an agreement that 
both details and admits the allegations. 
2. Denial 
It is not enough for regulators to decide whether to require 
settling targets to make admissions. An accompanying question 
is whether to allow the enforcement targets to deny wrongdoing 
for the same conduct. 
One possibility is not only to allow targets to avoid making 
admissions, but also to allow them to deny the allegations. This 
combination of no admission and denial may be built into the 
formal settlement documents. Several examples can be found in 
the context of the FTC. In one case, for example, the FTC ac-
cused a data broker of disclosing the records of 200,000 con-
sumers.108 The consent judgment between the data broker and 
the FTC explicitly stated that “[d]efendant makes no admis-
sions to, and denies, the allegations in the complaint.”109 
Facebook reached a similar agreement with the FTC in 
2012 in relation to allegations made about its privacy practic-
es.110 A paragraph in the consent order notes that the agree-
ment “[does] not constitute an admission . . . that the law has 
been violated as alleged in the draft complaint, or that the facts 
as alleged in the draft complaint . . . are true.”111 The para-
graph also includes an explicit denial: Facebook “expressly de-
nies the allegations set forth in the complaint.”112 This provi-
sion triggered a dissent from one of the FTC commissioners, in 
part because it allowed Facebook to deny the allegations.113 
 
 108. Hearing on Settlement Practices, supra note 33, at 82 n.24. 
 109. U.S. v. ChoicePoint, No. 1:06-CV-0198, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98749, 
at *2 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 15, 2006) (emphasis added). 
 110. Facebook, Inc., No. 092 3184, 2011 WL 6092532 (Fed. Trade Comm’n 
Nov. 29, 2011) (agreement containing consent order), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/ 
default/files/documents/cases/2011/11/111129facebookagree.pdf. For related 
documents see Facebook, Inc., FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/ 
enforcement/cases-proceedings/092-3184/facebook-inc (last visited Feb. 2, 
2018). 
 111. Facebook, Inc., 2011 WL 6092532, ¶ 5. The provision carved out “ju-
risdictional facts,” which were admitted. This is not about the underlying 
events, but is designed to prevent Facebook from challenging where (in what 
forum) this order was entered and dispute was resolved. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Facebook, Inc., No. 092 3184, Docket No. C-4365, 2012 WL 3301153 
(Fed. Trade Comm’n Aug. 10, 2012) (dissenting statement of Commissioner J. 
Thomas Rosch), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_ 
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A particularly detailed denial can be found in a 2010 set-
tlement between the DOJ’s Civil Division and AstraZeneca for 
False Claims Act allegations. The agreement first uses what 
seems to be fairly standard language in this context: “Agree-
ment is neither an admission of facts or liability by AstraZene-
ca nor a concession by the United States that its claims are not 
well founded.”114 But the provision then goes on to make a ful-
some denial: 
AstraZeneca expressly denies the allegations of [listed enforcement 
agencies and actions] and denies that it has engaged in any wrongful 
conduct. Neither this Agreement, its execution, nor the performance 
of any obligation under it, including any payment, nor the fact of set-
tlement, are intended to be, or shall be understood as, an admission of 
liability or wrongdoing, or other expression reflecting on the merits of 
the dispute by AstraZeneca.115 
Other examples are less formal. Agencies are concerned 
about the possibility that the settlement documents will pro-
vide that the target does not admit anything, but that the tar-
get will then make a public statement denying wrongdoing or 
responsibility—providing a “revisionist history in press releas-
es.”116 The CFTC’s procedural rules specifically anticipate and 
 
statements/dissenting-statement-commissioner-j.thomas-rosch-matter 
-facebook-inc./120810facebookstatement.pdf; see also Consent Decree at 2, 
United States v. Ford Motor Co. (D.D.C. June 27, 1998), https://www.epa.gov/ 
sites/production/files/documents/fordmotor-cd.pdf (“WHEREAS, Ford has de-
nied and continues to deny the violations alleged in the Complaint.”). 
 114. AstraZeneca, 4 (Dep’t of Justice Apr. 27, 2010) (settlement agree-
ment), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-edpa/legacy/2011/05/05/ 
astrazeneca_settlementagreement.pdf; see also Youth and Family Centered 
Servs., 10 (Dep’t of Justice Apr. 22, 2009) (settlement agreement and mutual 
releases), https://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/pae/News/2009/apr/ 
southwoodsettlementagreement.pdf; Ashland Hosp. Corp., 4 (Dep’t of Justice) 
(settlement agreement), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-edky/ 
legacy/2014/05/28/kingsdaughterssettlement.pdf (“This Settlement Agreement 
is neither an admission of liability by KDMC nor a concession by the United 
States that its claims are not well founded.”). Advice to entities settling False 
Claim Act actions suggests that this language or a close equivalent is common 
in FCA settlements. See Jonathan Cone et al., Negotiating False Claims Act 
Settlements, WEST BRIEFING PAPERS, Feb. 2014, at 6, https://www.crowell 
.com/files/Negotiating-False-Claims-Act-Settlements.pdf. 
 115. AstraZeneca, supra note 114, at 4. 
 116. Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Setting Forth Aspira-
tions for 2011, Address to Practising Law Institute’s SEC Speaks in 2011 Pro-
gram (Feb. 4, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch020411laa.htm; 
see also Hearing on Settlement Practices, supra note 33, at 24 (“[E]veryone fo-
cuses on the ‘no admit,’ but there is also a ‘no deny’ aspect, which means in our 
settlements, individual entities can’t then after the settlement get on the 
courthouse steps and say, ‘We deny liability.’”); Grantham, supra note 58 
(quoting the general counsel of a company that settled with the SEC for sup-
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bar this more informal denial, providing that the settling target 
must agree not to “take any action or make any public state-
ment denying, directly or indirectly, any allegation in the com-
plaint or findings or conclusions in the order, or creating, or 
tending to create, the impression that the complaint or the or-
der is without a factual basis.”117 
The criminal analog is the Alford plea, in which a defend-
ant pleads guilty but at the same time asserts his or her inno-
cence.118 In the Supreme Court case for which such pleas are 
named, the defendant asserted that “I pleaded guilty on second 
degree murder because they said there is too much evidence, 
but I ain’t shot no man . . . . I’m not guilty but I plead guilty.”119 
Although constitutionally permissible, Alford pleas are strongly 
disfavored, in keeping with the norm of requiring a factual ba-
sis to underlie pleas in criminal enforcement.120 
3. No Denial 
The other possibility is that a target agrees to a settlement 
while neither admitting nor denying anything. The Wells Fargo 
enforcement actions provide an example: Wells Fargo settled 
with the CFPB “without admitting or denying the findings of 
facts and conclusions of law.”121 At least since the 1970s, most 
of the SEC’s settlements have been made explicitly on this ba-
sis. Typical language in the consent decree provides that the 
defendant consents to the settlement “without admitting or 
denying any of the allegations.”122 This language is often re-
 
pressing whistleblower suits as saying that “[w]e never intended to prevent 
whistleblower lawsuits,” and that “the company settled with the SEC to avoid 
litigation costs”). 
 117. 17 C.F.R. § 10, app. A (2017). 
 118. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970); see also Buell, supra 
note 20, at 507. 
 119. Alford, 400 U.S. at 28 n.2. 
 120. Buell, supra note 20, at 507–08. 
 121. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 2016-CFPB-0015, 2 (Consumer Fin. Prot. 
Bureau Sept. 4, 2016) (consent order), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/ 
documents/092016_cfpb_WFBconsentorder.pdf; see also Wells Fargo Bank, 
N.A., AA-EC-2016-67, 1 (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Sept. 6, 
2016), http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2016/nr-occ-2016 
-106a.pdf (“[T]he Comptroller finds, and the Bank neither admits nor de-
nies . . . .”). 
 122. See, e.g., WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-CV-4963 (JSR) (Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 
July 2003) (consent and undertaking), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/ 
wcomconsent070303.htm; see also, e.g., Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., No. 17-03, 
2016 WL 7429257, at 1, 19 (Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n Dec. 21, 
2016) (order instituting proceedings), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/ 
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peated in the press release or litigation release in which the 
SEC announces its enforcement actions.123 
Interestingly, the SEC refuses to allow silence. Its rules 
provide that the “refusal to admit the allegations” will be treat-
ed as “equivalent to a denial” unless the settling target explicit-
ly states that “he neither admits nor denies the allegations.”124 
A rationale for prohibiting silence was expressed by the FTC 
commissioner who dissented in an enforcement action against 
Facebook. He worried that language stating that a consent 
agreement was “for settlement purposes only” might be “tan-
tamount to a denial.”125 
Here too a rough criminal analog exists: the nolo contende-
re plea in which a defendant pleads guilty without admitting 
guilt.126 Although permitted by the rules of criminal proce-
dure,127 prosecutors and courts heavily discourage its use.128 
B. ADMISSION 
The core example of settlements that require admissions 
comes from outside of civil enforcement. Admissions are a cen-
tral part of the criminal law settlement model. Plea agree-
ments, nonprosecution agreements, and deferred prosecution 
agreements have in common that they resolve criminal matters 
through agreement. One feature of these agreements is that 
they require the target to admit responsibility.129 Even for cor-
porations, the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual provides that “[a] corpo-
ration should be made to realize that pleading guilty to crimi-
 
@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfgoldmansachsorder122116 
.pdf. 
 123. See, e.g., Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Morgan Stanley Paying 
$13 Million Penalty for Overbilling Clients and Violating Custody Rule (Jan. 
13, 2017) [hereinafter Morgan Stanley Press Release], https://www.sec.gov/ 
news/pressrelease/2017-12.html; Litigation Release No. 14722, Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Am. Bus. Sec., Inc., Civil Action No. 94-4866 
ER(JRx) (C.D. Cal.) (Nov. 16, 1995), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/ 
lr14722.txt (“These defendants consented, without admitting or denying the 
allegations in the Complaint, to the entry of the Final Judgments.”). 
 124. 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(e) (2017). 
 125. Facebook, Inc., No. 092 3184, Docket No. C-4365, 2012 WL 3301153 
(Fed. Trade Comm’n Aug. 10, 2012) (dissenting statement of Commissioner J. 
Thomas Rosch), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_ 
statements/dissenting-statement-commissioner-j.thomas-rosch-matter 
-facebook-inc./120810facebookstatement.pdf. 
 126. Buell, supra note 20, at 506–07. 
 127. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(1). 
 128. Buell, supra note 20, at 507–08. 
 129. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
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nal charges constitutes an admission of guilt and not merely a 
resolution of an inconvenient distraction from its business.”130 
When advocating a policy of requiring admissions, the 
headlines and critiques about civil enforcement practices often 
point to admitting “responsibility” or “guilt” or “wrongdoing.”131 
Former SEC Chair White suggested that “[t]here is nothing 
quite like a company or corporate executive who violated the 
securities laws openly and publicly admitting their guilt.”132 
But what exactly must targets admit? When translated into a 
policy or applied to a single case, agencies must be specific 
about the nature of the admissions they wish to negotiate. Even 
in the context of criminal plea agreements, for instance, which 
is the core example of required admissions, a settling defendant 
both “admits to the facts supporting the charges” and, separate-
ly, “admits guilt.”133 Variations and combinations exist, and the 
lines between categories are not absolute, but three rough cate-
gories can be identified: admissions of fact, of violations of the 
law, and of state of mind. 
1. Facts 
Distinctions between admissions of facts and legal viola-
tions are sometimes expressly made in the agency’s rules of 
procedure. The FTC’s rules about settlement, for instance, pro-
vide that settlement agreements shall contain “either an ad-
mission of the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law 
submitted simultaneously by the Commission’s staff” or a 
waiver of the required findings of fact.134 Separately, these 
rules provide that the agreement “does not constitute an ad-
mission by any party that the law has been violated.”135 
 
 130. 9-28.1500-Plea Agreements with Corporations, OFFICE U.S. ATT’YS, 
https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution 
-business-organizations (last visited Feb. 2, 2018). 
 131. See, e.g., Corkery, supra note 12; Germaine, supra note 17; Taibbi, su-
pra note 16; White, supra note 19. 
 132. Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The Challenge of Cover-
age, Accountability and Deterrence in Global Enforcement, Address to the 
IOSCO 39th Annual Conference (Oct. 1, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/News/ 
Speech/Detail/Speech/1370543090864. 
 133. CRIM. DIV. OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & ENF ’T DIV. OF THE U.S. 
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT 
PRACTICES ACT 74 (Nov. 14, 2012) (outlining how criminal and civil FCPA cas-
es are resolved). 
 134. 16 C.F.R. § 2.32 (2017). 
 135. Id. 
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The distinction between facts and other types of admis-
sions has also been made in particular settlement agreements. 
For instance, the SEC brought an enforcement action against 
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) Ratings Services that was settled in 
administrative proceedings in January 2015.136 The settlement 
provided that S&P consented to the SEC’s order “without ad-
mitting or denying the findings herein,” but at the same time 
S&P explicitly admitted the facts detailed in an appendix.137 
Another example comes from the FCC. A June 2017 order and 
consent decree required an admission of particular facts, with-
out any “other admission of liability or violation of any law, 
regulation or policy,” noting explicitly that “the Bureau makes 
no finding of any such liability or violation.”138 
In other instances, targets seem to admit some specific 
facts because they have already made similar admissions in 
separate proceedings. In a 2015 administrative settlement be-
tween the SEC and Standard Bank, for instance, the consent 
order specified that the bank entered into the agreement “with-
out admitting or denying the findings herein,” except for facts 
admitted in a matter before the U.K. Serious Fraud Office.139 
Factual admissions may be required in part to prevent lat-
er denials. The U.S. Attorneys’ Manual makes this connection 
explicitly. For corporate pleas, for instance, it provides that 
“pleas should be structured so that the corporation may not lat-
er ‘proclaim lack of culpability or even complete innocence.’ . . . 
 
 136. Standard & Poor ’s Ratings Servs., No. 3-16348, 2015 WL 252448 (Sec. 
& Exch. Comm’n Jan. 21, 2015) (instituting administrative and cease-and-
desist proceedings), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/33-9705.pdf. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Pocatello Channel 15, LLC, 32 FCC Rcd. 4705 (Fed. Comm. Comm’n 
June 2, 2017) (consent decree), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/ 
DA-17-540A1.pdf (“19. Admission of Liability. Pocatello admits to the facts 
discussed in paragraphs 3-10 regarding its failure to meet the requirements of 
the Communications Laws. By entering into this Consent Decree, Pocatello 
makes no other admission of liability or violation of any law, regulation or pol-
icy, and the Bureau makes no finding of any such liability or violation . . . .”). 
The following consent decrees use identical language in their Admission of Li-
ability paragraphs: KM Television of Iowa LLC, 32 FCC Rcd. 1535 (Mar. 2, 
2017), http://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-17-214A1.pdf; Mission 
Broadcasting, Inc., 31 FCC Rcd. 13766 (Dec. 15, 2016), https://apps.fcc.gov/ 
edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-16-177A1.pdf; Life of Victory TV, Inc., 31 FCC 
Rcd. 11628 (Oct. 21, 2016), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA 
-16-1176A1.pdf. 
 139. Standard Bank PLC, No. 3-16973, 2015 WL 7713706, at 1 (Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n Nov. 30, 2015) (order instituting cease-and-desist proceedings), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/33-9981.pdf. 
 1106 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:1077 
 
Thus, for instance, there should be placed upon the record a 
sufficient factual basis for the plea to prevent later corporate 
assertions of innocence.”140 
2. Legal Violations 
Admissions of legal violations might take several forms. A 
target might admit to violations of specific laws, a general body 
of law, the complaint’s allegations, or violations of (unspecified) 
law in general. 
Several FCC settlements after 2014 include admissions of 
specific statutes or rules. In one such example, Time Warner 
Cable (TWC) entered into a consent decree with the Agency in 
which it admitted that its conduct “violated the Commission’s 
rules.”141 Other FCC settlement agreements from this period 
include similar language pointing to specific rule violations.142 
In some settlements that include admissions, respondents 
have admitted to legal violations broadly, rather than to viola-
tions of specific provisions. For example, agreements have in-
cluded this language: respondents or defendants “acknowledge 
that their conduct violated the federal securities laws”143 or 
 
 140. 9-28.1500-Plea Agreements with Corporations, supra note 130. 
 141. Time Warner Cable Inc., 29 FCC Rcd. 9992, at 3 (Aug. 25, 2014) (or-
der), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-14-1126A1.pdf (“6. 
Admission of Liability. TWC admits, solely for the purpose of this Consent De-
cree and for Commission civil enforcement purposes, and in express reliance 
on the provisions of paragraph 8 herein [that details limits on the agency’s 
further action], that the circumstances described in paragraph 3 [failure to file 
reports] herein constitute violations of the Commission’s Network Outage Re-
porting Rules.”). 
 142. See, e.g., St. George Cable, Inc., 31 FCC Rcd. 3663, at 4 (Apr. 29, 2016) 
(consent decree), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-16-415A1 
.pdf (“Admission of Liability. St. George admits for the purpose of this Consent 
Decree and for Commission civil enforcement purposes, and in express reli-
ance on the provisions of paragraph 8 herein, that the operation of its cable 
system violated the Cable Signal Leakage Rules, EAS Rules, and Registration 
Rules, as detailed in paragraph 4 herein.”); Johnson Towers Corp., 30 FCC 
Rcd. 12275, at 3 (Nov. 2, 2015) (consent decree), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_ 
public/attachmatch/DA-15-742A1.pdf (“9. Admission of Liability. JTC admits 
for the purpose of this Consent Decree and for Commission civil enforcement 
purposes, and in express reliance on the provisions of paragraph 8 herein, that 
its actions referenced in paragraph 4 herein and the NAL violated the Anten-
na Structure Rules.”). 
 143. See, e.g., Bank Leumi le-Israel B.M., No. 3-17631, 2016 WL 6081797, 
at 1 (Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Oct. 18, 2016) (order instituting administrative and 
cease-and-desist proceedings), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34 
-79113.pdf; Credit Suisse AG, No. 3-17617, 2016 WL 5800369, at 1 (Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n Oct. 5, 2016) (order instituting cease-and-desist proceedings), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/33-10229.pdf; Citigroup Global 
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“acknowledge that the conduct set forth in [the admitted facts] 
violated the federal securities laws.”144 These particular exam-
ples—actions against Bank Leumi, Credit Suisse, and 
Citigroup Global Markets—involve both an admission of par-
ticular facts and an admission of violation of the securities 
laws.145 Although the consent orders include language describ-
ing the particular provisions that were violated, even in some 
cases noting that the actions were “willful,” these are not cap-
tured within the scope of the admissions.146 
3. State of Mind 
One particular type of admission has to do with the state of 
mind of the enforcement target. As in other contexts, state of 
mind refers to the subjective intention of the target. Such ad-
missions could be viewed as factual admissions (was the tar-
get’s conduct intentional?) or legal admissions (did the target 
act with the scienter required for the violation?). State of mind 
is worth considering as a separate category, however, in part 
because intentionality is important to the line between criminal 
and civil actions, and in part because the empirical literature 
suggests that people may react differently to admissions de-
pending on whether the underlying behavior was intention-
al.147 
Many existing settlements seem to be drafted with an eye 
to what they say about the target’s state of mind. For instance, 
in a 2013 SEC enforcement action against ConvergEx broker-
ages, the defendants admitted to the facts and admitted that 
they “engaged in a fraudulent scheme by taking steps to inten-
tionally or recklessly conceal from customers the practice of 
taking” the undisclosed trading profits.148 The ConvergEx de-
fendants also admitted that their “conduct violated the federal 
 
Markets, Inc., No. 3-17338, 2016 WL 4363820, at 1 (Sec. & Exch. Comm’n July 
12, 2016) (order instituting administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-78291.pdf. 
 144. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 113 S.E.C. Docket 26, 2 (Dec. 18, 2015) 
(order instituting administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings), https:// 
www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/33-9992.pdf. 
 145. See sources cited supra note 143. 
 146. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., No. 3-17338, 2016 WL 436820, at 6 
(“As a result of the conduct described above, CGMI willfully violated the 
recordkeeping and reporting requirement . . . .”). 
 147. See infra notes 316–21. 
 148. G-Trade Servs. LLC, 107 S.E.C. Docket 5418, 1, 6 (Dec. 18, 2013) (or-
der instituting administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings) (emphasis 
added), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2013/34-71128.pdf. 
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securities laws,”149 but did not admit they actually “intentional-
ly or recklessly [concealed],” and arguably did not admit to act-
ing with scienter.150 
At least in the securities context, practical concerns about 
collateral consequences may drive agency settlements that 
avoid admissions of intentionality or recklessness. In particu-
lar, a target’s admission to a violation that requires only negli-
gence is not useful in later Rule 10b-5 securities fraud claims 
by private plaintiffs because such claims require a showing of 
scienter.151 
 
Table 1: Admissions Options for Regulators 
No Admissions Admissions 
Factual Allegations Facts 
Denial Not Prohibited 
• Pre-1970 SEC policy 
• Alford plea in criminal law 
Legal Violations 
• Specific provisions 
• General violations 
 Denial Prohibited 
• Pre-2013 SEC policy 
(“Neither admit nor deny”) 
• Nolo contendere pleas in criminal law 
State of Mind 
 
Table 1 summarizes the choices for regulators. These ap-
proaches to admissions are not mutually exclusive. Rather, 
regulators may combine them within one policy that sometimes 
requires admissions152 or within a single settlement that re-
quires several types of admissions (e.g., facts and legal viola-
tion).153 Accordingly, these approaches to requiring admissions 
 
 149. Id. at 1. 
 150. Id. at 2, 6. They also did not admit to violating Rule 10b-5, which was 
listed in the factual allegations but not encompassed by the admissions. Id. at 
1, 11. 
 151. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). 
 152. See infra Part III.C (describing the SEC’s hybrid policy); see also Staff 
Notice, Ont. Sec. Comm’n., Update to OSC Staff Notice 15-704 on Proposed 
Enforcement Initiatives (June 13, 2013), http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/ 
en/Securities-Category1/sn_20130605_15-706_update-sn15-704.pdf (outlining 
the admissions policy of the Ontario Securities Commission and identifying 
the circumstances in which no-contest settlements would be available). 
 153. See, e.g., Guida & Flores, supra note 63, at 152 (noting that the EPA 
will sometimes “[h]ave respondent admit jurisdiction, fact allegations and con-
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are relevant to agency decisions regardless of whether the 
agency takes a uniform, blanket approach to admissions, de-
cides whether to require admissions case-by-case at the level of 
the particular settlement, or adopts hybrid policies that some-
times require admissions of wrongdoing. 
III.  ADMISSIONS OF WRONGDOING IN SEC 
ENFORCEMENT   
The SEC provides a rich example of the debate over 
whether to require settling targets to admit wrongdoing. The 
Agency’s policy has changed over time, in part in response to a 
very public debate over the function of admitting wrongdoing. 
This Part traces the development of the SEC’s policy on admis-
sions, examining the calls for revisiting this policy and the 
SEC’s response. 
A. THE SEC’S “NO-ADMIT-NO-DENY” POLICY 
For a long time, the SEC did not require settling defend-
ants to admit wrongdoing. Instead the SEC followed a no ad-
mission approach and was silent on whether defendants could 
also deny wrongdoing.154 The Agency, however, was concerned 
that targets followed their settlement with the SEC with public 
announcements that pointed to pragmatic reasons for settle-
ment, such as the costs of litigation and the benefits of closure, 
while denying wrongdoing for the charged behavior.155 
In the early 1970s, these concerns led the SEC to change 
its admissions policy.156 The SEC still did not require admis-
sions of wrongdoing, but did begin to prohibit enforcement tar-
gets from denying wrongdoing.157 The new policy meant that 
the SEC would not “permit a defendant or respondent to con-
sent to a judgment or order that imposes a sanction while deny-
ing the allegations in the complaint or order for proceedings.”158 
 
clusions of law” and will “[s]ometimes [propose] ‘neither admits nor denies’”); 
1st Alliance Lending, LLC, No. 2014-CFPB-0003, 2014 WL 3685991, at 2 
(Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau Feb. 24, 2014) (consent order), http://files 
.consumerfinance.gov/f/201402_cfpb_consent-order_first-alliance.pdf 
(“[A]dmitting the findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth below” in set-
tlement documents with the CFPB). 
 154. See supra Part II.A. 
 155. See Aguilar, supra note 116. 
 156. Consent Decrees in Judicial or Administrative Proceedings, 1972 WL 
125351 (Nov. 28, 1972) (codified as amended at 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(e) (2017)). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 1110 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:1077 
 
Under the new policy, the Agency required settling targets to 
specify that they did not deny the allegations; silence was not 
enough.159 The administrative release that announced this no-
admit-no-deny policy pointed to the concern that “it is im-
portant to avoid creating, or permitting to be created, an im-
pression that a decree is being entered or a sanction imposed, 
when the conduct alleged did not, in fact, occur.”160 
The Agency’s no-admit-no-deny policy has been reflected in 
provisions within settlement agreements. Language in settle-
ment agreements specifies that the target consents to the set-
tlement “without admitting or denying any of the allega-
tions.”161 The litigation or press releases in which the SEC 
announces its enforcement activities also sometimes point to 
this feature of the settlement.162 
B. OBJECTIONS TO THE POLICY 
The SEC’s no-admit-no-deny policy has long had its critics. 
As one newspaper article from the 1990s put it: “[W]hen it 
comes to financial misconduct—stealing, cheating, fraud—
companies have a terrific out. They can settle the charges with-
out admitting they’ve done anything wrong. In return for large 
wads of cash, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
allows most corporate offenders to dodge acknowledgment of 
their offenses.”163 Nonetheless, the SEC’s policy persisted until 
 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See, e.g., SEC v. Worldcom, Inc., No. 02-CV-4963 (JSR), 2002 WL 
31748604, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2002). 
 162. See, e.g., Litigation Release No. 22134, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 
Citigroup to Pay $285 Million to Settle SEC Charges for Misleading Investors 
About CDO (Oct. 19, 2011) (noting that Citigroup settled “[w]ithout admitting 
or denying the SEC’s findings”); Morgan Stanley Press Release, supra note 
123 (noting that the target consented “[w]ithout admitting or denying the find-
ings that it violated various provisions” of the securities laws). 
 163. Rothchild, supra note 22, at 51; see also Mutual Funds: Trading Prac-
tices and Abuses that Harm Investors, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. 
Mgmt., the Budget, & Int’l Sec. of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 
108th Cong. (2003) (statement of William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts) (“Too often the guilty neither admit or deny 
any wrongdoing and routinely promise not to cheat again until they can come 
up with a more clever method to do what they just said they would not do 
again.”). 
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after the financial crisis of 2007, when it came under increasing 
scrutiny.164 
Judge Jed Rakoff, a federal trial judge in the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, led the charge with vocal objections to the 
policy.165 The debate was reported in national newspapers and 
prompted commentary that analyzed the policy dynamics.166 
Two cases that grew out of the financial crisis prompted 
the very public showdown over the SEC’s admissions require-
ment. At issue were cases that the SEC filed in federal trial 
court in New York, alleging securities law violations by Bank of 
America and Citigroup during the 2007 financial crisis.167 The 
facts came straight out of the crisis: Citigroup, for instance, had 
allegedly created and marketed a fund, while simultaneously 
shorting many of the fund’s assets, betting that those assets 
would decline in value.168 According to the court, Citigroup 
profited by about $160 million, while investors lost $700 mil-
lion.169 
The SEC and Citigroup agreed to settle the case “on a nei-
ther admit nor deny basis”170 and presented the proposed set-
 
 164. See Edward Wyatt, S.E.C. Changes Policy on Firms’ Admission of 
Guilt, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/07/business/ 
sec-to-change-policy-on-companies-admission-of-guilt.html. 
 165. This critique of the SEC’s policy was a recurring theme for Judge 
Rakoff. See, e.g., SEC v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d 304, 
309 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (describing the “palpable . . . disservice to the public in-
herent” in the SEC’s use of no-admit-no-deny settlements). 
 166. See, e.g., Buell, supra note 20 (articulating the deterrent effects and 
public benefits of requiring admissions of wrongdoing in public enforcement 
actions); Radvany, supra note 63 (discussing how the shift in SEC policy about 
admissions would affect settlement practices); David S. Hilzenrath, Judge Re-
bukes SEC on Citigroup Deal, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2011, at A16 (noting that 
Rakoff “slammed the SEC for following its standard practice of allowing de-
fendants to settle charges without admitting or denying wrongdoing”); Edward 
Wyatt, Judge Rejects SEC’s Deal—Settlement in Citigroup Case Isn’t “Fair ,” 
HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 29, 2011, at B6; Sarah N. Lynch, SEC Chief Defends 
“Neither Admit nor Deny” but Will Review, REUTERS (May 7, 2013), http://www 
.reuters.com/article/us-sec-settlement/sec-chief-defends-neither-admit-nor 
-deny-but-will-review-idUSBRE94612F20130507. 
 167. See SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (rejecting proposed settlement), vacated, 752 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 
2014); SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 507, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(rejecting proposed settlement). 
 168. Complaint, supra note 94, at *2. 
 169. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 329. 
 170. See Memorandum by Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission in 
Support of Proposed Settlement at *4, Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., 827 F. 
Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2011) (No. 11 Civ. 7387 (JSR)), 2011 WL 
7561370. 
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tlement to Judge Rakoff, for his review. Not so fast, said Judge 
Rakoff. His opinion denying the settlement provided an extend-
ed critique of the failure to require admissions, calling the poli-
cy “hallowed by history, but not by reason.”171 The return to 
harmed investors from such a settlement would be diminished, 
because investors would not be able to take advantage of the 
admissions in parallel private securities litigation.172 The judge 
argued, moreover, that the policy “deprives the Court of even 
the most minimal assurance that the substantial injunctive re-
lief it is being asked to impose has any basis in fact.”173 
The court of appeals rejected the district court’s reasoning, 
essentially for being insufficiently deferential to the adminis-
trative agency.174 It characterized the district court as express-
ing a policy view: “The district court believed it was a bad poli-
cy, which disserved the public interest, for the S.E.C. to allow 
Citigroup to settle on terms that did not establish its liabil-
ity.”175 The problem with the trial court’s decision, according to 
the appeals court, was that “dictat[ing] policy to executive ad-
ministrative agencies” was not “the proper function of federal 
courts.”176 
C. SEC’S POLICY CHANGE 
Although Judge Rakoff’s rejection of the proposed settle-
ment in Citigroup was ultimately reversed by the court of ap-
peals,177 it left its mark on SEC policy and the terms of the de-
bate. The SEC did not remain silent in response to these public 
critiques.178 In addition to being the subject of attention and 
critique outside the Agency, the Agency’s policy was increasing-
ly criticized from the inside as well.179 In the wake of Judge 
Rakoff’s Citigroup opinion, for instance, one SEC commissioner 
 
 171. See Citigroup Glob. Mkts., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 332. 
 172. Id. at 332–33 (“[C]ounsel for Citigroup . . . noted, correctly, that he 
was free—notwithstanding the S.E.C.’s gag order precluding Citigroup from 
contesting the S.E.C.’s allegations in the media—to fully contest the facts in 
any parallel litigation; and he strongly hinted that Citigroup would do just 
that.”). 
 173. Id. at 332. 
 174. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., 673 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Robert Khuzami, Dir., Div. of Enf ’t, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Court’s Re-
fusal To Approve Settlement in Citigroup Case, Public Statement by SEC 
Staff (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch112811rk.htm. 
 179. See, e.g., Aguilar, supra note 116. 
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called for the Agency to require admissions.180 Ultimately, the 
Agency announced—first in 2012 and then again in 2013—that 
it would expand the circumstances in which enforcement tar-
gets would have to make admissions to settle. 
The first changes came in 2012, when the SEC eliminated 
the “without admitting or denying” language from settlements 
with enforcement targets who had also settled a criminal case, 
or had been convicted in a criminal action based on the same 
facts.181 It makes some sense that the initial steps to modify 
admissions policy appeared in these cases. As noted above, the 
criminal model requires admissions in settlements.182 Some of 
the key SEC positions during this period were filled by former 
criminal prosecutors. For instance, the head of the SEC’s Divi-
sion of Enforcement, appointed in 2009, had been a federal 
prosecutor for more than a decade before going to work for the 
SEC.183 He was the one to announce this first change to SEC 
admissions policy, which expanded in an area explicitly related 
to criminal proceedings.184 
Change to the admissions policy continued during the ten-
ure of SEC Chair Mary Jo White, who was in the position from 
April 2013 until January 2017.185 Again, in some ways, this 
continued attention was unsurprising. Like the head of en-
forcement, White’s background was in criminal law: she was a 
former U.S. Attorney and federal prosecutor.186 In public 
speeches, White explicitly stated that her experience with crim-
inal law and prosecutions shaped her view of admissions.187 
 
 180. See, e.g., id. 
 181. Robert Khuzami, Dir., Div. of Enf ’t, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Recent Pol-
icy Change, Public Statement by SEC Staff (Jan. 7, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/ 
news/public-statement/2012-spch010712rskhtm. 
 182. See supra note 85. 
 183. Khuzami Will Lead SEC Enforcement, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 20, 2009), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123508426606527305. 
 184. Khuzami, supra note 181. 
 185. Biography: Mary Jo White, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, https:// 
www.sec.gov/biography/white-mary-jo (last visited Feb. 2, 2018). 
 186. Id. 
 187. White, supra note 19 (“[M]uch of my thinking on this issue was 
shaped by the time I spent in the criminal arena, where courts cannot accept a 
guilty plea without the defendant first admitting to the unlawful conduct. An-
yone who has witnessed a guilty plea understands the power of such admis-
sions—it creates an unambiguous record of the conduct and demonstrates un-
equivocally the defendant’s responsibility for his or her acts.”); Mary Jo White, 
Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, A New Model for SEC Enforcement: Producing 
Bold and Unrelenting Results, Speech at the NYU School of Law Program on 
Corporate Compliance and Enforcement and the NYU School of Law Pollack 
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In a speech in 2013, White announced that the Agency 
would require admissions in an expanded category of cases.188 
White noted that an SEC priority was to “demand accountabil-
ity.”189 A key way to achieve that aim was to require admis-
sions of wrongdoing in cases where there was “a special need 
for public accountability and acceptance of responsibility.”190 
White identified four categories in which “admissions might be 
appropriate”: 
Cases where a large number of investors have been harmed or the 
conduct was otherwise egregious. 
Cases where the conduct posed a significant risk to the market or in-
vestors. 
Cases where admissions would aid investors deciding whether to deal 
with a particular party in the future. 
Cases where reciting unambiguous facts would send an important 
message to the market about a particular case.191 
Although she spoke of “admissions,” “public accountability,” 
and “responsibility,” White was silent about what precisely 
should be admitted—whether fact, legal violation, or state of 
mind.192 As we will see in the next Section, the SEC’s choices 
among these types of admissions as they implemented the new 
policy became a subject of much critique. 
D. SEC ADMISSIONS PRACTICES 
Following its announced change in policy, the SEC has re-
quired admissions of wrongdoing in some enforcement settle-
ments. In an empirical study of admissions in SEC settlements 
during the years spanning the policy change, we identified set-
tlements containing some sort of admission—of facts, legal vio-
 
Center for Law and Business (Nov. 18, 2016) [hereinafter White, A New Mod-
el], https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/chair-white-speech-new-york-university 
-111816.html. (“My views on this are, of course, informed by my experience as 
a federal prosecutor where criminal defendants—individuals or entities—must 
voluntarily admit their guilt if they agree to plead guilty.”). 
 188. White, supra note 19; see also James B. Stewart, S.E.C. Has a Mes-
sage for Firms Not Used to Admitting Guilt, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/22/business/secs-new-chief-promises-tougher-
line-on-cases.html. 
 189. See White, supra note 19. 
 190. Id.; see also White, SEC Speaks, supra note 24 (pointing to admissions 
of wrongdoing to provide “a greater measure of public accountability, which, in 
turn, can bolster the public’s confidence in the strength and credibility of law 
enforcement, and the safety of our markets”). 
 191. White, supra note 19. 
 192. Id. 
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lation, scienter, or some combination.193 Even after the an-
nounced policy changes, very few SEC settlements contained 
this language.194 
One early example was J.P. Morgan’s admission of speci-
fied facts and violation of the federal securities laws in the 
SEC’s London Whale enforcement action concerning a trader 
who lost nearly six billion dollars.195 More recently, the SEC 
highlighted two such settlements in their announcement of 
2016 enforcement results.196 The press release announced the 
Agency’s settlement with Merrill Lynch for “violating customer 
protection rules by misusing customer cash and putting cus-
tomer securities at risk” and noted both the penalty amount 
($415 million) and that “[t]he firm also admitted wrongdo-
ing.”197 The agency also touted “[a] $267 million enforcement 
action against J.P. Morgan wealth management subsidiaries, 
for failing to disclose conflicts of interest to clients,” noting 
again that “[t]he firms also admitted wrongdoing.”198 Under the 
heading “Demanding Admissions in Important Cases Enhanc-
ing Public Accountability,” the SEC’s press release also identi-
fied six examples of cases in which it had “[d]emanded and ob-
tained acknowledgements of wrongdoing under the admissions 
 
 193. Verity Winship & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, An Empirical Study of Ad-
missions in SEC Settlements, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (identifying 
and analyzing SEC settlements containing admissions); see also David Rosen-
feld, Admissions in SEC Enforcement Cases: The Revolution That Wasn’t, 103 
IOWA L. REV. 113 (2017). Earlier articles identified particular cases in which 
the SEC has required (or failed to require) admissions. See, e.g., Peter R. 
Flynn, Note, Admission of Wrongdoing: Increasing Public Accountability in 
SEC Settlements, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 538 (2014) (describing 
several such cases); Siegel, supra note 63 (identifying and describing eight 
matters in which the SEC required admissions from 2012 to 2014). 
 194. Winship & Robbennolt, supra note 193. 
 195. JPMorgan Chase & Co., supra note 82, at 2; JPMorgan Press Release, 
supra note 66; Radvany, supra note 63, at 695. 
 196. Press Release 2016-212, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces En-
forcement Results for FY 2016 (Oct. 11, 2016) [hereinafter 2016 Press Re-
lease], https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-212.html. 
 197. Id. The underlying agreement includes an admission of fact (admitting 
to four of six sections containing factual allegations) and an admission of legal 
violation (the targets “acknowledge that their conduct violated the federal se-
curities laws”). Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., No. 3-17312, 2016 
WL 4363431 (Sec. & Exch. Comm’n June 23, 2016) (order instituting adminis-
trative and cease-and-desist proceedings), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/ 
admin/2016/34-78141.pdf. 
 198. 2016 Press Release, supra note 196; JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 
3-17008, 2015 WL 9256635 (Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Dec. 18, 2015) (order insti-
tuting administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings) (detailing the agree-
ment underlying the press release). 
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policy.”199 The subject matter was varied—from false and mis-
leading audits, to an Ethiopian electric utility’s sales of securi-
ties to the Ethiopian diaspora, to a computer coding error that 
caused flawed reporting.200 
Though limited in scope, some context for these settle-
ments is provided in a study, by the NYU Pollack Center for 
Law & Business and Cornerstone Research, that examined 
SEC settlements with public companies and their subsidiaries 
for fiscal years 2010 through 2016.201 The study analyzed the 
top ten settlements for that period, measured by penalty 
amount.202 Seven of the top ten required admissions.203 Former 
SEC Chair White indicated that the SEC had required admis-
sions from seventy-seven enforcement targets as of November 
2016.204 
Critics of the SEC’s implementation of the Agency’s new 
admissions policy have pointed to three flaws they perceive in 
the SEC’s admissions practices since 2013.205 First, they point 
to low numbers or percentage of cases in which the Agency re-
quired any type of admission.206 In 2015, Senator Elizabeth 
Warren sent a critical letter to then-Chair White listing the 
“[f]ailure to [r]equire [a]dmissions of [w]rongdoing in SEC 
[e]nforcement [c]ases” as one of the “extreme[] disap-
point[ments]” of White’s term.207 According to Senator Warren, 
only nineteen of five hundred and twenty settlements with the 
 
 199. 2016 Press Release, supra note 196. 
 200. Id. 
 201. CHOI ET AL., supra note 47. 
 202. Id. at 8. 
 203. Id. To our knowledge, there are few broader empirical analyses that 
paint a systematic picture of what agencies have required in terms of admis-
sions. More in-depth empirical analysis of agency settlements would be a wel-
come development. For an example, see Winship & Robbennolt, supra note 
193, at 7. 
 204. White, A New Model, supra note 187 (reporting admissions from thir-
ty individuals and forty-seven entities since the admissions policy was insti-
tuted). 
 205. Using our data on admissions in SEC settlements, we analyze these 
critiques in Winship & Robbennolt, supra note 193, at 7. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Letter from Elizabeth Warren, Senator, U.S. Senate, to Mary Jo 
White, Chair, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, 1, 4 (June 2, 2015), http://www.warren 
.senate.gov/files/documents/2015-6-2_Warren_letter_to_SEC.pdf; MJ Lee, 
Elizabeth Warren to Wall Street Cop: “Step Up,” CNN (June 2, 2015), http:// 
www.cnn.com/2015/06/02/politics/elizabeth-warren-mary-jo-white-sec (report-
ing Warren’s criticism of “the agency’s failure to extract admissions of guilt 
from financial institutions in legal settlements”). 
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SEC between June 2013 and September 2014 included an ad-
mission.208 
Second, commentators criticize the Agency for the types of 
cases in which admissions have been required.209 One of the 
themes of the report, Rigged Justice: How Weak Enforcement 
Lets Corporate Offenders off Easy, is the absence of admissions 
in the settlement of major cases.210 Some critics suggest that 
admissions have been required mostly in “low-profile” cases 
and “garden-variety frauds.”211 However, commentators have 
also noted that the pattern of enforcement is difficult to dis-
cern, in part because of the low numbers.212 
Third, critics point to the types of admissions that have 
been required, making the rubric developed here particularly 
relevant.213 One concern has been that the admissions often do 
not go far enough, because they require only the admission of 
facts.214 Senator Warren wrote to Chair White that “the record 
of the SEC under your leadership is even worse than those 
numbers [of settlements that included admissions] suggest” be-
cause most “required only a broad admission of facts specified 
by the SEC rather than requiring that these firms admit to vio-
lations of specific securities laws.”215 Senator Warren pointed to 
critics who called these factual admissions “the weakest admis-
sion of guilt as [sic] possible.”216 
 
 208. Letter from Elizabeth Warren, supra note 207, at 5. 
 209. Winship & Robbennolt, supra note 193, at 7. 
 210. OFFICE OF SENATOR ELIZABETH WARREN, RIGGED JUSTICE: HOW 
WEAK ENFORCEMENT LETS CORPORATE OFFENDERS OFF EASY (Jan. 2016); 
Warren Releases Rigged Justice Report Detailing Lax Corporate Crime En-
forcement, CORP. CRIME REP. (Jan. 29, 2016), https://www 
.corporatecrimereporter.com/news/200/warren-release-rigged-justice-report 
-detailing-lax-corporate-crime-enforcement (noting that Senator Warren’s re-
port “highlights 20 of the most egregious civil and criminal cases during the 
past year in which federal settlements failed to require meaningful accounta-
bility to deter future wrongdoing and to protect taxpayers and families”). 
 211. Germaine, supra note 17 (“Although the [SEC] has scored a few nota-
ble admissions in the past three years, critics say many cases have been low-
profile and involved garden-variety frauds and securities law violations.”); 
Taibbi, supra note 16. 
 212. See Germaine, supra note 17 (noting criticism that the SEC hasn’t 
“followed through” on its approach of requiring more admissions). 
 213. Winship & Robbennolt, supra note 193, at 7. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Letter from Elizabeth Warren, supra note 207, at 5–6. 
 216. Id. at 6 (quoting Stephen Gandel, Did the SEC Let JP Morgan off the 
Hook?, FORTUNE (Sept. 20, 2013), http://fortune.com/2013/09/20/did-the-sec-let 
-jpmorgan-off-the-hook). 
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IV.  THE ROLE OF ADMISSIONS IN SETTLEMENT   
What difference does an agency’s admissions policy make 
to the agency? The answer lies in part in the ways in which ob-
taining admissions might either further or interfere with the 
enforcement and other goals of the agency, and in part in how 
the approach to admissions affects settlement negotiations with 
targets. We have seen concerns about the collateral conse-
quences of admissions for targets and agency concerns about 
litigation costs and how best to deploy scarce resources.217 
There are also a variety of reasons why agencies might want to 
bargain for admissions. The ability to obtain admissions from 
enforcement targets has consequences for the agency’s own en-
forcement goals, as well as its public image. Moreover, if the 
agency decides that admissions are called for, the agency will 
be better able to effectively bargain for admissions if it under-
stands the range of consequences that admissions—and partic-
ular types of admissions—have for targets.218 To this end, in 
this Part, we review the reasons that agencies might value ad-
missions from the targets of enforcement. We explore the impli-
cations for settlement negotiation of the different admissions 
models—denial; no-admit-no-deny; and specific types of admis-
sions. Throughout, we draw on empirical studies to identify fac-
tors for agencies to consider when negotiating with enforce-
ment targets. 
Agencies have diverse structures and goals, so one size will 
certainly not fit all when it comes to administrative enforce-
ment. We, therefore, do not answer the ultimate question of 
how agencies should weigh these concerns against other conse-
quences in any particular area or particular settlement. In-
stead, we take seriously these articulated goals, and ask what 
choices about admissions might further them, drawing on exist-
ing empirical research on blame, acknowledgement, claiming, 
the attribution of responsibility, and apologies. We conclude 
this Part by highlighting several implications of this research, 
including some (possibly counterintuitive) aspects of targets’ 
relationship to admissions and to denial. 
 
 217. See supra Parts I.B, I.C. 
 218. Effective negotiators think about the interests of the other side and 
interests that the two sides may share. See generally G. RICHARD SHELL, BAR-
GAINING FOR ADVANTAGE: NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES FOR REASONABLE PEO-
PLE 76–88 (1999) (describing how identifying the other party’s interests can 
improve negotiations). 
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A. VALUE OF ADMISSIONS TO AGENCY AND PUBLIC 
1. Public Accountability 
At their core, admissions are one mechanism by which to 
provide public accountability. The need for accountability has 
been a prominent concern in the debate over whether to require 
admissions. In rejecting the settlement in the Citigroup case, 
for example, Judge Rakoff highlighted “an overriding public in-
terest in knowing the truth.”219 One of the articulated reasons 
for the SEC’s subsequent change in policy was that, at least in 
certain types of cases, admissions “may be required for a reso-
lution to achieve public accountability.”220 Calls for accountabil-
ity reflect, at least in part, a broad desire for the targets of en-
forcement to take responsibility or to be held responsible for 
their actions.221 
Interestingly, studies reflect desire for apologies and ac-
knowledgment of responsibility not only from individuals, but 
 
 219. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332, 335 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011), vacated, 752 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 2014) (noting that without ad-
missions the “public is deprived of ever knowing the truth in a matter of obvi-
ous public importance”). 
 220. Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The Importance of Trials 
to the Law and Public Accountability, 5th Annual Judge Thomas A. Flannery 
Lecture (Nov. 14, 2013), https://sec.gov/news/speech/20113-spch111413mjw; 
see also Press Release, George Canellos, Co-Dir., Div. of Enf ’t, Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, Statement on SEC Enforcement Action Against JPMorgan (Sept. 19, 
2013), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/canellos-statement 
-9-19-13 (“At its core, today’s case is about transparency and accountability, 
and [the target’s] admissions are a key component in that message.”); Where 
the SEC Action Will Be, WALL ST. J., June 24, 2013, at R4, https://www.wsj 
.com/articles/SB10001424127887323893504578555990184592624 (quoting 
Mary Jo White as noting that “[p]ublic accountability in particular kinds of 
cases can be quite important”). 
 221. The SEC claims that its efforts to obtain admissions have added a 
measure of accountability to their efforts. Andrew Ceresney, Co-Dir., Div. of 
Enf ’t, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Financial Reporting and Accounting Fraud, 
Speech at the American Law Institute Continuing Legal Education (Sept. 19, 
2013), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch091913ac (“[T]here is a certain 
amount of accountability that comes from a defendant admitting to unambigu-
ous, uncontested facts.”); White, supra note 132 (“[A]dmissions do indeed bring 
about greater public accountability. There is nothing quite like a company or 
corporate executive who violated the securities laws openly and publicly ad-
mitting their guilt.”); Morgenson, supra note 18 (“In cases where we have ob-
tained admissions, it adds accountability, and that has been very important.”) 
(quoting Andrew Ceresney, the SEC’s head of enforcement). 
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also from organizations such as corporations.222 The fact that 
organizational apologies and acceptance of responsibility seem 
to matter does not mean that the considerations are identical 
for individuals and entities or that agencies must approach set-
tlement with individuals and entities as one and the same.223 
Nor is there general agreement about related concepts, such as 
what it means to blame a corporation.224 It does, however, sug-
gest that the mere fact that a civil enforcement target is insti-
tutional does not resolve whether to seek admissions. 
2. Deterrence 
In addition to accountability, agencies are concerned about 
the effect of enforcement on the behavior of those within their 
jurisdiction. Indeed, one of the primary goals of agency en-
forcement is to accomplish deterrence.225 Deterrence is also im-
portant to public audiences for agency action.226 Studies have 
shown that injured parties and the public are motivated to pre-
vent future harm—people want to know that offenders have 
learned from their mistakes and have taken steps to prevent 
the recurrence of similar behavior and similar harm in the fu-
ture.227 Admissions have a part to play in affecting deterrence 
 
 222. See, e.g., Kristin M. Pace et al., The Acceptance of Responsibility and 
Expressions of Regret in Organizational Apologies After a Transgression, 
15 CORP. COMM. 410, 420 (2010); infra note 273 and accompanying text. 
 223. Tom R. Tyler & Avital Mentovich, Punishing Collective Entities, 19 
J.L. & POL’Y 203, 228–29 (2010). 
 224. See, e.g., Miriam H. Baer, Too Vast to Succeed, 114 MICH. L. REV. 
1109, 1120, 1120 n.52 (2016) (noting that “scholars vigorously disagree on the 
propriety of ‘blaming’ a corporation” and citing articles in the debate); Tyler & 
Mentovich, supra note 223, at 228; see also Steven J. Sherman & Elise J. Per-
cy, The Psychology of Collective Responsibility: When and Why Collective Enti-
ties Are Likely to be Held Responsible for the Misdeeds of Individual Members, 
19 J.L. & POL’Y 137 (2010) (exploring the ways that individuals and entities 
are perceived). 
 225. White, supra note 19 (“And when we resolve cases, we need to be cer-
tain our settlements have teeth, and send a strong message of deterrence . . . 
and cause would-be future offenders to think twice.”). 
 226. See Buell, supra note 20, at 514 (discussing how guilty pleas with suf-
ficient facts are critical for the DOJ). 
 227. Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Patients’ and Physicians’ Attitudes Re-
garding the Disclosure of Medical Errors, 289 JAMA 1001 (2003) (finding that 
patients wanted disclosure of errors, prevention of recurrence, and apology); 
Kathleen M. Mazor et al., Health Plan Members’ Views About Disclosure of 
Medical Errors, 140 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 409, 415 (2004); Kathleen M. 
Mazor et al., More than Words: Patients’ Views on Apology and Disclosure 
When Things Go Wrong in Cancer Care, 90 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNS. 341, 344 
(2013); Tamara Relis, “It’s Not About the Money!”: A Theory on Misconceptions 
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through their collateral impact on parallel legal actions and 
through the reputational consequences they may have for en-
forcement targets.228 
Acknowledgement of the offense can be important to deter-
rence because it signals that the offender will not act in the 
same way again in the future. Studies of apologies, for example, 
find that people are more likely to believe that wrongful behav-
ior is aberrational and less stable when the offender has apolo-
gized for the wrongful behavior.229 In particular, taking respon-
sibility for the wrongful behavior conveys that the offender 
understands the ways in which the behavior violated shared 
norms and will take steps not to repeat it.230 Without admis-
 
of Plaintiffs’ Litigation Aims, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 701 (2007) (finding that 
plaintiffs often have extra-legal aims); Charles Vincent et al., Why Do People 
Sue Doctors? A Study of Patients and Relatives Taking Legal Action, 343 LAN-
CET 1609, 1611 (1994). 
 228. Buell, supra note 20, at 512–13. These consequences for targets have 
not gone unnoticed. For example, 
after the FCC changed its policy to require admissions, one law firm 
warned in January 2015 that “companies must now admit to liability 
in the consent decree. One of the major benefits of consent decrees in 
the past was that it expressly stated that the targeted company had 
not been found guilty. Not only is that statement gone, the company 
must actually admit it violated the rules.” 
FCC Enforcement Update–2014 Year in Review, FISH & RICHARDSON (Jan. 13, 
2015), https://www.fr.com/news/fcc-enforcement-update-2014-year-in-review. 
 229. See, e.g., James R. Davis & Gregg J. Gold, An Examination of Emo-
tional Empathy, Attributions of Stability, and the Link Between Perceived Re-
morse and Forgiveness, 50 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 392 
(2011); Gregg J. Gold & Bernard Weiner, Remorse, Confession, Group Identity, 
and Expectancies About Repeating a Transgression, 22 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 291 (2000); Ken-ichi Ohbuchi et al., Apology as Aggression Control: 
Its Role in Mediating Appraisal of and Response to Harm, 56 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 219, 221 (1989); Jennifer F. Orleans & Michael B. Gurtman, 
Effects of Physical Attractiveness and Remorse on Evaluations of Transgres-
sors, 6 ACAD. PSYCHOL. BULL. 49 (1984); Randolph B. Pipes & Marci Alessi, 
Remorse and a Previously Punished Offense in Assignment of Punishment and 
Estimated Likelihood of a Repeated Offense, 85 PSYCHOL. REP. 246 (1999); 
Robbennolt, Legal Settlement, supra note 25; Robbennolt, Settlement Levers, 
supra note 25; Dawn T. Robinson et al., Heinous Crime or Unfortunate Acci-
dent? The Effects of Remorse on Responses to Mock Criminal Confessions, 73 
SOC. FORCES 175 (1994); Bernard Weiner et al., Public Confession and For-
giveness, 59 J. PERSONALITY 281, 291 (1991). 
 230. Steven J. Scher & John M. Darley, How Effective Are the Things Peo-
ple Say to Apologize? Effects of the Realization of the Apology Speech Act, 26 J. 
PSYCHOLINGUISTIC RES. 127, 134–36 (1997) (analyzing responses to different 
components of apologies). 
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sions, it is difficult to believe that behavior and practices will 
improve.231 
One critique of no-admit-no-deny policies is that they do 
not address these concerns about changing and improving be-
havior going forward. As one commentator has noted, “The rea-
son [no-admit-no-deny] fails as a deterrent is the same compa-
nies keep doing the same thing over and over even after they 
enter into these agreements . . . . They not only don’t admit and 
don’t deny, they don’t change.”232 A similar criticism notes that 
no-admit-no-deny policies “preclude[] reputational harm and 
potential private liability considerations that might more effec-
tively deter future misconduct.”233 
Beyond the broader deterrence considerations of ensuring 
that the overall consequences of the enforcement action are suf-
 
 231. See, e.g., Daryl Koehn, When Saying “I’m Sorry” Isn’t Good Enough: 
The Ethics of Corporate Apologies, 23 BUS. ETHICS Q. 239, 246 (“[W]ithout ex-
plicit acknowledgement of a particular harm, CEOs will find it hard to restore 
trust, because they and the audience will not know whether the two parties 
are even on the same page regarding the breach of trust [and that in order to] 
lay out some action steps for restoring trust by repairing the breach . . . the 
CEO needs to indicate that he or she acknowledges that the firm erred in some 
particular way.”); see also Buell, supra note 20, at 513. 
 232. SEC’s Andrew Ceresney Defends Neither Admit nor Deny Settlements, 
CORP. CRIME REP. (June 6, 2013), https://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/ 
news/200/secceresneyneitheradmitnordeny06062013 (quoting Robert Weiss-
man, President of Public Citizen). This concern was at the forefront of a furor 
over remarks by Novartis CEO Joe Jimenez about a prospective settlement 
between Novartis and the DOJ in 2015. See Gary Giampetruzzi & Terra Reyn-
olds, 5 Takeaways from the Novartis FCA Settlement, LAW360 (Nov. 1, 2015), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/720152/5-takeaways-from-the-novartis-fca 
-settlement. Jimenez was reported in the press as saying:  
We’re not admitting liability, it’s something we just believe we want 
to put behind us and that’s why we’ve reached an agreement and set-
tlement in principle . . . . We continue to maintain that specialty 
pharmacies must continue to play a role in ensuring patient adher-
ence . . . . How that’s going to play out as to whether we change our 
behavior or not remains to be seen.  
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting D. Roland & J. Letzing, Novartis Profit Hurt by 
U.S. Settlement, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
novartis-profit-hurt-by-u-s-settlement-1445928106). Novartis later “clarifi[ed]” 
that the statements “did not accurately reflect our position and the serious-
ness of the Company’s commitment to working with the government to ensure 
our behaviors and interactions with specialty pharmacies meet the highest 
ethical standards” and that it would make specific admissions of fact. Id. 
 233. Edward Greene & Caroline Odorski, SEC Enforcement in the Finan-
cial Sector: Addressing Post-Crisis Criticism, 16 BUS. L. INT’L 5, 12 (2015). 
And, indeed, the SEC’s change in policy has been said to be because “in certain 
cases, more may be required for a resolution . . . to be, and viewed to be, a suf-
ficient punishment to send a strong message of deterrence.” White, supra 
note 220. 
 2018] ADMISSIONS OF GUILT 1123 
 
ficient to incentivize compliance,234 requiring admissions may 
also be an important initial step that allows the enforcement 
target to make changes to practices and procedures that can 
help to prevent reoffense. In other words, making admissions 
may help set the conditions for future improvement: 
When an organization covers up a problem, be it an internal one like 
sexual harassment or an external one like a defective product, not on-
ly does it risk recurrences of that specific problem, but it may set in 
motion various dysfunctional dynamics. Casualties may include open 
conversations, truth telling, and corporate morale. The organization 
may steadily lose its best workers as employees with integrity may 
leave and employees who tolerate cover-ups remain. Conversely, even 
if daunting at first, responsibility-taking can ultimately boost corpo-
rate morale.235 
Though it arose out of a criminal proceeding in Canada, a 
case involving Suncor Energy, Inc. (“Suncor”), a large Canadi-
an energy company, is an instructive example of a target that 
disclosed relevant facts as part of a settlement agreement with 
an eye toward improving its environmental practices. 
Rather than simply pay a fine, the company saw . . . an opportunity to 
“prevent future incidents by others and ourselves . . . [and] capture 
learnings so they get shared more broadly.” A manager framed it this 
way: “a lot of companies would be very embarrassed by what hap-
pened and would want to get it behind them as quick as possible. Pay 
the bill and move on. The simple fact that Suncor is ready to open the 
kimono here a little bit—I think it’s a good thing. And I think we’ll 
learn from it, and I think others will as well.”236 
 
 234. “[I]nstilling in others an expectation that there will be tough enforce-
ment of all applicable laws is an essential ingredient to ensuring that corpo-
rate actors weigh their incentives properly—and do not ignore massive risks in 
blind pursuit of profit.” OFFICE OF SENATOR ELIZABETH WARREN, supra note 
210, at 4 (quoting Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Attorney 
General Holder Remarks on Financial Fraud Prosecutions at NYU School of 
Law (Sept, 17, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general 
-holder-remarks-financial-fraud-prosecutions-nyu-school-law). 
 235. Jonathan R. Cohen, The Immorality of Denial, 79 TUL. L. REV., 903, 
943 (2005). For discussion of importance of accepting responsibility for learn-
ing and reform in the criminal context, see Bibas, supra note 32, at 1363–64; 
see also Buell, supra note 20, at 513 (“[A] firm’s public declaration of the na-
ture and facts of its own wrongdoing might spur more introspection and re-
form among the firm’s managers, employees, and owners than would a bare 
legal judgment in which a firm simply concedes that its government litigation 
adversary has something of a case, and the firm says it chooses to settle the 
whole thing so it can ‘move on.’”). 
 236. Stephanie Bertels et al., A Responsive Approach to Organizational 
Misconduct: Rehabilitation, Reintegration, and the Reduction of Reoffense, 24 
BUS. ETHICS Q. 343, 355 (2014). Suncor also participated in public dialogue 
with the public and its peers. Comments about this conversation included the 
following: “I was very impressed by the amount of honest disclosure from Sun-
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In these ways, then, responsibility-taking through admissions 
may help to serve the agency’s overall enforcement goals. 
3. Agency Legitimacy 
Finally, in addition to their value for public accountability 
and deterrence, admissions have important implications for 
public perceptions of the legitimacy of the administrative agen-
cies themselves. Legitimacy is “a generalized perception or as-
sumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs, and definitions.”237 Trust238 that the authority 
has “people’s best interests at heart” and perceptions that the 
agency’s goals are aligned with those of the community both in-
fluence perceptions of legitimacy.239 Agencies, therefore, are 
more likely to be perceived as legitimate when their decisions 
 
cor”; “this provided a good opportunity to ask questions and gain frank re-
sponses”; “a good opportunity for learning and reflection which could lead to 
issues being avoided in the future.” Id. at 357. 
 237. Mark C. Suchman, Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional 
Approaches, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 571, 574 (1995); see also Tom R. Tyler & 
Jonathan Jackson, Popular Legitimacy and the Exercise of Legal Authority: 
Motivating Compliance, Cooperation, and Engagement, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 78, 90 (2014) (“Legitimacy is about people’s perception and recep-
tion of power and authority.”). On legitimacy, see generally Tom R. Tyler, Psy-
chological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. PSY-
CHOL. 375 (2006) (explaining the importance of legitimacy to the success of 
authorities and institutions). On the legitimacy of the SEC, see, for example, 
KAREN R. BRYCE, MAINTAINING AND REGAINING ORGANIZATIONAL LEGITIMA-
CY: THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (2012). Our focus here 
is on public perceptions of legitimacy. We recognize that different stakeholders 
may have differing perceptions of legitimacy. See, e.g., Anna Lamin & Srilata 
Zaheer, Wall Street vs. Main Street: Firm Strategies for Defending Legitimacy 
and Their Impact on Different Stakeholders, 23 ORG. SCI. 47 (2012). 
 238. See generally Craig W. Thomas, Maintaining and Restoring Public 
Trust in Government Agencies and Their Employees, 30 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 166 
(1998) (discussing how public officials can produce, maintain, and restore pub-
lic trust). Trust involves an expectation that the other will act with benevo-
lence and competence. Roderick M. Kramer & Roy J. Lewicki, Repairing and 
Enhancing Trust: Approaches to Reducing Organizational Trust Deficits, 4 
ACAD. MGMT. ANNALS 245, 257 (2010). Overall, trust in government is rela-
tively low. PEW RESEARCH CTR., BEYOND DISTRUST: HOW AMERICANS VIEW 
THEIR GOVERNMENT 4 (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.people-press.org/files/2015/ 
11/11-23-2015-Governance-release.pdf; see also Uri Friedman, Trust in Gov-
ernment is Collapsing Around the World, ATLANTIC (July 1, 2016), http://www 
.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/07/trust-institutions-trump-brexit/ 
489554. 
 239. Tyler & Jackson, supra note 237, at 78. A third aspect of legitimacy is 
“authorization of authority (felt obligation to obey).” Id. 
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are perceived as being neutral, based on the merits of each 
case, and responsive to a shared set of underlying values.240 
Being perceived as legitimate is important to accomplish-
ing an agency’s overall goals. When an institution is viewed by 
the public as being legitimate, it may experience broader sup-
port for its mission, find it easier to do its work effectively, and 
obtain an increased level of compliance with its mandates.241 In 
contrast, when the institution does not uphold shared values 
and is not perceived as legitimate, the public can become cyni-
cal and unsupportive, which can leave the institution suscepti-
ble to increased criticism.242 Indeed, the failure to insist on ac-
countability has been cited as an enforcement failing that 
“undermines the foundations” of federal enforcement.243 
The absence of agreed upon facts to support the conse-
quences in an enforcement action or misalignment between any 
admitted facts and the consequences imposed may also lead ob-
servers to conclude that an agency’s actions are illegitimate. As 
Judge Rakoff concluded, “a proposed Consent Judgment that 
asks the Court to impose substantial injunctive relief, enforced 
by the Court’s own contempt power, on the basis of allegations 
unsupported by any proven or acknowledged facts whatsoever; 
is neither reasonable, nor fair, nor adequate, nor in the public 
interest.”244 Others have noted that “[t]here is something trou-
 
 240. Suchman, supra note 237; Tyler, supra note 237, at 392 (“Widespread 
legitimacy will exist only when the perspectives of everyday members are en-
shrined in institutions and in the actions of authorities.”). 
 241. ROBERT W. JACKMAN, POWER WITHOUT FORCE: THE POLITICAL CA-
PACITY OF NATION-STATES 22 (1993) (“[T]o be reasonably effective, institutions 
must have a moderate aura of legitimacy.”); see also Tyler, supra note 237, at 
379. 
 242. See Suchman, supra note 237, at 575 (quoting John W. Meyer & Brian 
Rowan, Institutional Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 
in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 41, 50 (Walter 
W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991) (“Organizations that . . . lack ac-
ceptable legitimated accounts of their activities . . . are more vulnerable to 
claims that they are negligent, irrational or unnecessary.”); see also supra Part 
III.B and notes 207–16 and accompanying text (describing criticisms of the 
SEC). 
 243. OFFICE OF SENATOR ELIZABETH WARREN, supra note 210, at 1. 
 244. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011) (emphasis added), vacated, 752 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 2014). These concerns 
parallel those that arise in criminal plea bargaining: “Alford and nolo conten-
dere pleas send mixed messages, breeding public doubt, uncertainty, and lack 
of respect for the criminal justice system. Far from encouraging honesty, they 
let guilty defendants cloak their pleas in innocence. In contrast, jury verdicts 
and unequivocal guilty pleas suppress residual doubts and promote public con-
fidence.” Bibas, supra note 32, at 1386–87. 
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bling about a public enforcement action that ends with a con-
clusion of ‘maybe he (they) did it, maybe he (they) didn’t, but 
he’s (they are) paying a price for it in any event.’”245 
In contrast, obtaining admissions from defendants might 
animate perceptions of agency legitimacy. Cases in which an 
agency obtains an admission as part of an enforcement action 
can help to foster a sense among the public that the agency en-
forcement has teeth and that appropriate and unbiased regula-
tory action is occurring. In the case of the SEC, for example, 
admissions elicited from J.P. Morgan were said to have had the 
effect of “bolstering public confidence for an agency long criti-
cized for being too soft on Wall Street.”246 Such successes vali-
date the legitimacy of the agency’s goals, strategies, and effec-
tiveness247 and such legitimacy is likely to feed back into the 
agency’s ability to accomplish deterrence.248 
B. VALUE OF ADMISSIONS TO TARGETS 
In addition to considering how admissions might directly 
further the goals of the agency, agencies negotiating admis-
sions must take into account targets’ willingness to make ad-
missions. This requires agencies to consider, in a nuanced way, 
the potential effects of admissions on targets. In this regard, 
the collateral consequences we described above are significant 
and focal. But, in contrast to conventional legal wisdom, admis-
sions, particularly when coupled with apologies or steps toward 
reform, may have beneficial effects for enforcement targets, as 
well as for agencies. Indeed, crisis communications experts of-
 
 245. Buell, supra note 20, at 510. 
 246. Dina ElBoghdady & Danielle Douglas, JPMorgan’s Admission: A 
Symbolic Victory for the SEC, of Limited Use in Private Lawsuits, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 19, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/jpmorgan 
-chase-to-pay-920-million-for-london-whale-trading-loss/2013/09/19/0c9d7d52 
-2130-11e3-b73c-aab60bf735d0_story.html. The SEC itself has claimed that 
when defendants acknowledge wrongdoing it “boosts investors’ confidence in 
the SEC’s enforcement program and in our markets.” White, supra note 132; 
cf. Miriam H. Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92 B.U. L. REV. 577, 580–81 (2012) 
(making the point that an agency’s choice to punish targets by “deliver[ing] 
just deserts and communicat[ing] moral condemnation” attracts more public 
support and gives the agency more flexibility than regulation). 
 247. See Suchman, supra note 237, at 592 (describing the ways in which 
successes—both technical and attention grabbing—can establish legitimacy). 
 248. See Buell, supra note 20, at 514 (noting the link between legitimacy 
and deterrence: “If the enterprise of public prosecution appears unprincipled 
or even random, then surely deterrence is seriously weakened”). 
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ten advise companies against litigation and in favor of making 
admissions: 
  A legal strategy, although of use in limiting liability exposure, is 
ineffective at best, especially when one considers the dynamic social 
milieu in which organizations operate. Although damage to a bottom 
line is a bona fide concern, so too is damage to a company’s reputa-
tion, which also has bottom-line implications. A more effective ap-
proach to a crisis is a public relations strategy, in which an organiza-
tion voluntarily admits that a problem exists, aims to be candid as 
possible, releases all the bad news (at once, if possible), and articu-
lates the measures that are being taken to correct the problem.249 
Enforcement targets, therefore, ought to weigh both the poten-
tial collateral consequences and the potential reputational ef-
fects of making admissions. And agencies negotiating with en-
forcement targets would be well served by having a more 
complete understanding of how these considerations might play 
out for different targets. 
1. Denial 
Targets’ instincts may be to deny everything.250 Denial, 
however, “is typically processed as an addendum” to the origi-
nal information, meaning that the denial is not likely to erase 
the initial impression made by the allegations.251 Even more 
importantly, the public may be skeptical of the denial itself. 
At a fundamental level, denial or attempts to avoid the issue are sug-
gestive of concealment and intransigence and serve to erode public 
trust in the organization. Main Street is often skeptical of corporate 
pronouncements, particularly when organizations are seen to be 
stonewalling or denying blame. Denial in effect stigmatizes the firm 
 
 249. KEITH MICHAEL HEARIT, CRISIS MANAGEMENT BY APOLOGY: CORPO-
RATE RESPONSE TO ALLEGATIONS OF WRONGDOING 41 (2006). 
 250. Nicole Gillespie & Graham Dietz, Trust Repair After an Organization-
Level Failure, 34 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 127, 140 (2009) (“[O]rganizations often 
face legal, commercial, and/or shareholder pressures to ‘save face’ and ‘never 
admit culpability,’ potentially closing off these conciliatory remedial responses 
in the minds of management.”). 
 251. Daniel M. Wegner et al., The Transparency of Denial: Briefing in the 
Debriefing Paradigm, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 338, 340 (1985) 
[hereinafter Wegner et al., Transparency of Denial] (“Far from erasing an im-
pression, then, a denial accompanies an impression.”); see also Daniel T. Gil-
bert et al., You Can’t Not Believe Everything You Read, 65 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 221, 231 (1993); Daniel M. Wegner et al., Incrimination 
Through Innuendo: Can Media Questions Become Public Answers?, 40 J. PER-
SONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 822, 831 (1981) [hereinafter Wegner et al., Incrim-
ination Through Innuendo] (discussing the effects that innuendo in media 
headlines has on individual perceptions of guilt). 
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with the public, causing “remaining constituents [to] curtail their 
support,” thereby negatively affecting its legitimacy.252 
Denial may, therefore, ultimately hurt the target’s legitimacy 
and credibility with the public,253 resulting in longer-term 
harm to the target’s brand. 
Research has compared the effects of denials to the effects 
of other remedial responses, such as silence and apology. When 
the offense at issue involves a lack of competence, denials are 
not the most effective way to restore trust.254 This is because 
denial does not address any underlying concern about funda-
mental abilities and gives no assurance that steps will be taken 
to increase the level of competence displayed.255 
For alleged transgressions that are perceived to be matters 
of integrity, the effects of denials are more complicated. Re-
search has found that in the absence of evidence supporting the 
allegations, denial can be a more effective response than either 
silence or an apology.256 Because integrity violations are likely 
to be interpreted as signs of an overall lack of integrity, an 
apology confirms a type of violation that is perceived as less 
likely to change.257 But, if the denial is contradicted by evi-
dence of the transgression, any benefits of denial are under-
 
 252. Lamin & Zaheer, supra note 237, at 53 (alteration in original) (inter-
nal citations omitted) (quoting Blake E. Ashforth & Barrie W. Gibbs, The 
Double-Edge of Organizational Legitimation, 1 ORG. SCI. 177, 183 (1990)). 
 253. Lamin & Zaheer, supra note 237, at 59; see also Gillespie & Dietz, su-
pra note 250, at 137 (arguing that denial is not a credible response to an or-
ganizational failure). 
 254. Peter H. Kim et al., Removing the Shadow of Suspicion: The Effects of 
Apology Versus Denial for Repairing Competence- Versus Integrity-Based Trust 
Violations, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 104, 109 (2004); see also Silvia Grappi & 
Simona Romani, Company Post-Crisis Communication Strategies and the Psy-
chological Mechanism Underlying Consumer Reactions, 27 J. PUB. REL. RES. 
22, 36 (2015) (finding that denial did not reduce anger, increase sympathy, or 
improve views of the company). 
 255. Kim et al., supra note 254, at 107. Interestingly, denials appear to re-
sult in less condoning of a transgression as compared to other ways of account-
ing for behavior such as explanation or apology. See Valerie S. Folkes & Yun-
Oh Whang, Account-Giving for a Corporate Transgression Influences Moral 
Judgment: When Those Who “Spin” Condone Harm-Doing, 88 J. APPLIED PSY-
CHOL. 79, 82 (2003). 
 256. Donald L. Ferrin et al., Silence Speaks Volumes: The Effectiveness of 
Reticence in Comparison to Apology and Denial for Responding to Integrity- 
and Competence-Based Trust Violations, 92 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 893, 894 
(2007). 
 257. Id. at 899–900, 903 (2007); Kim et al., supra note 254, at 109, 113. But 
see Roy J. Lewicki et al., An Exploration of the Structure of Effective Apologies, 
9 NEGOT. & CONFLICT MGMT. RES. 177, 191 (2016) (finding acknowledgment of 
responsibility to be important in cases involving integrity violations). 
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mined and trust is particularly damaged.258 That is, if an of-
fender denies wrongdoing, but that denial is proven to be false, 
the damage to trust is significantly worse than it would other-
wise have been. This is an important caveat. As we have seen, 
in cases of civil enforcement, the agency’s allegations and the 
evidence for those allegations will have already been put for-
ward, in detail, in the complaint and will be articulated again 
in the consent order itself. Once the allegations have been 
made, it would not be surprising if relevant constituencies be-
lieve that where there is smoke, there is fire—whether or not 
the evidence would hold up at trial.259 
In cases in which the defendant settles the case with the 
agency by agreeing to pay large penalties, inferences of wrong-
doing may be even stronger. For example, in response to a set-
tlement by Merrill Lynch with the Attorney General of New 
York, then-Attorney General Eliot Spitzer said: “[y]ou don’t pay 
a $100 million fine if you didn’t do anything wrong.”260 And 
more recently, Judge Victor Marrero commented on a proposed 
settlement between the SEC and SAC Capital Advisors in a 
case involving insider trading: “[t]here is something counterin-
tuitive and incongruous about settling for $600 million if [SAC] 
truly did nothing wrong.”261 Under such circumstances, denial 
can have negative consequences for targets. 
 
 258. W. Timothy Coombs et al., Debunking the Myth of Denial’s Effective-
ness in Crisis Communication: Context Matters, 20 J. COMM. MGMT. 381, 383 
(2016); see also Kim et al., supra note 254, at 108–09. 
 259. See Ferrin et al., supra note 256, at 896 (“Even though an allegation 
may be unsubstantiated, perceivers are, in a sense, hardwired to unquestion-
ingly incorporate this information into their belief structure and then only un-
accept it under certain conditions.”). This concern underlies the issues with 
pretrial publicity. See generally Brian H. Bornstein et al., Pretrial Publicity 
and Civil Cases: A Two-Way Street?, 26 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 3 (2002); see also 
Gilbert et al., supra note 251; Wegner et al., Incrimination Through Innuendo, 
supra note 251; Wegner et al., Transparency of Denial, supra note 251. What 
people infer from the fact that a target settled an enforcement action and 
whether and how the nature of the settlement influences those inferences are 
empirical questions that are worthy of further study. 
 260. Patrick McGeehan, $100 Million Fine for Merrill Lynch, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 22, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/22/business/100-million-fine 
-for-merrill-lynch.html; see also HEARIT, supra note 249, at 210 (“Cannot the 
willingness to settle and pay a $100 million fine be read as an admission of 
guilt?”); Jonathan R. Cohen, The Culture of Legal Denial, 84 NEB. L. REV. 247, 
260 (2005) (observing claims that “[t]he payment is the acknowledgment of 
fault”). 
 261. Peter Lattman, Judge is Skeptical of S.E.C. Deal with Hedge Fund, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2013), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/03/28/judge 
-questions-s-e-c-settlement-with-steven-cohens-hedge-fund. 
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2. Silence and No-Admit-No-Deny 
Targets face similar risks when they either remain silent 
or agree to state that they neither admit nor deny the allega-
tions. Remaining silent in the face of detailed allegations is not 
likely to be tenable or effective. Because observers tend “to be-
lieve rather than disbelieve,”262 unanswered allegations are 
likely to be accepted. “[T]he failure of reticence to challenge 
such information is likely to leave the perceiver with the same 
belief that he or she formed in response to the original allega-
tion—that the accused party is guilty.”263 In addition, because 
silence both “fails to disconfirm guilt” and “fails to convey re-
demption,” research has found that it is a suboptimal response 
in most cases.264 “Not offering any communication conveys a 
lack of concern and integrity, as well as incompetence.”265 
We have seen that agencies may refuse to allow targets to 
remain silent, treating the refusal to admit the allegations as a 
denial unless the target explicitly indicates that it neither ad-
mits nor denies the agency’s charges.266 Like silence, such no-
admit-no-deny provisions do not admit the allegations and, 
therefore, do not communicate that the target will do better in 
the future. And, like silence, no-admit-no-deny provisions do 
not deny the allegations and, therefore, do not attempt to dis-
confirm wrongdoing. It is possible, however, that no-admit-no-
deny provisions are worse for the target than silence, because 
the target must explicitly state that it does not deny the allega-
tions.267 
3. Admissions 
In contrast to silence or denial, making admissions may 
have positive reputational effects for the target, particularly in 
the long term.268 On one hand, admissions may confirm the 
 
 262. Ferrin et al., supra note 256, at 896. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. (“[R]eticence combines the worst elements of apology and denial: 
As a response to an integrity violation, reticence is akin to apology in that it 
fails to disconfirm guilt, and as a response to a competence violation, reticence 
is akin to denial in that it fails to convey redemption.”).  
 265. Gillespie & Dietz, supra note 250, at 138. 
 266. See supra notes 122–23. 
 267. This empirical question is worth additional exploration. 
 268. See generally HEARIT, supra note 249 (examining the role of apologies 
in crisis management); W. Timothy Coombs, Protecting Organization Reputa-
tions During a Crisis: The Development and Application of Situational Crisis 
Communication Theory, 10 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 163 (2007) (describing a 
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transgression.269 But recall that the allegations will already be 
detailed in the complaint or consent decree. Admissions, there-
fore, may be “unlikely to cause any further decline in trust [be-
yond the allegations themselves] because the admission only 
provides information that is consistent with the belief that the 
perceiver formed in response to the original allegation—that 
the accused party is guilty.”270 
More importantly, if properly made, admissions may be 
able to provide the acknowledgement that victims and the pub-
lic seek as a signal that the transgression will not be repeat-
ed.271 Injured parties and the public may also desire infor-
mation from the target,272 and admissions can satisfy that 
need. But targets may benefit even more by going beyond mere 
disclosure and coupling their admissions with apologies,273 
 
framework for managing threats to reputation); Gillespie & Dietz, supra note 
250, at 140 (exploring the role of admissions in trust repair). 
 269. Ferrin et al., supra note 256, at 894; Kim et al., supra note 254, at 
106. 
 270. Ferrin et al., supra note 256, at 896. 
 271. Id. at 899, 903; Gillespie & Dietz, supra note 250, at 140; Kim et al., 
supra note 254, at 108–09, 112–13. Error disclosure is widely discussed in the 
context of medical malpractice. One concern that is raised is that disclosure 
and apology will alert patients to errors of which they might not have other-
wise become aware. See generally Allen Kachalia et al., Liability Claims and 
Costs Before and After Implementation of a Medical Error Disclosure Program, 
153 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 213, 213 (2010) (recognizing concern that disclo-
sure might invite lawsuits); Michelle M. Mello et al., Communication-and-
Resolution Programs: The Challenges and Lessons Learned from Six Early 
Adopters, 33 HEALTH AFF. 20, 24 (2014) (describing concern that disclosure 
would increase litigation risk). The civil enforcement context differs in im-
portant ways from the medical disclosure context. As noted above, in cases of 
civil enforcement, the allegations are detailed in the agency’s complaint and in 
the consent order. See supra notes 96–104. 
 272. See, e.g., Gallagher et al., supra note 227, at 1004–05 (finding that in-
jured patients want and expect to receive information about what happened, 
what will be done, and their medical condition). 
 273. See, e.g., Coombs, supra note 268, at 172 (describing apologies as a 
“rebuilding” strategy); Gillespie & Dietz, supra note 250, at 140 (describing 
apologies as important to reputation and trust repair); Grappi & Romani, su-
pra note 254, at 26 (exploring the effects of a confessional strategy); Edward C. 
Tomlinson et al., The Road to Reconciliation: Antecedents of Victim Willing-
ness to Reconcile Following a Broken Promise, 30 J. MGMT. 165, 169 (2004) 
(exploring the role of apologies in repairing violations). An apology goes be-
yond simply admitting facts or even a violation, incorporating “acknowledg-
ment of the legitimacy of the violated rule, admission of fault and responsibil-
ity for its violation, and the expression of genuine regret and remorse for the 
harm done.” NICHOLAS TAVUCHIS, MEA CULPA: A SOCIOLOGY OF APOLOGY 
AND RECONCILIATION 3 (1991); see also NICK SMITH, I WAS WRONG: THE 
MEANINGS OF APOLOGIES 18–19 (2008). 
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making promises to improve in the future,274 and embracing 
steps toward reform.275 Indeed, crisis communication experts 
advise that companies investigate, disclose, and apologize.276 
Apologies are thought to be particularly appropriate and 
advisable when the crisis at hand involves violation of law or 
regulation.277 Establishing a collective account of the facts 
(what happened, how, and why), apologizing, and engaging in 
reparation and reform (as appropriate) to prevent future mis-
steps are central to repairing trust in the organization.278 In-
 
 274. Maurice E. Schweitzer et al., Promise and Lies: Restoring Violated 
Trust, 101 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 1, 15 (2006). 
 275. See, e.g., Vincent et al., supra note 227, at 1613; see also C. Harry Hui 
et al., The Impact of Post-Apology Behavioral Consistency on Victim’s For-
giveness Intention: A Study of Trust Violation Among Coworkers, 41 J. AP-
PLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1214, 1226–29 (2011) (exploring how behavior can un-
dermine or reinforce an apology). In some cases, targets may try to couple 
these types of additional measures with a settlement in which they do not 
make admissions. As we noted earlier, Wells Fargo settled the allegations 
against it with a number of administrative agencies, neither admitting nor 
denying the allegations. Wells Fargo also, however, made apologetic state-
ments in congressional hearings, to its employees, in full-page newspaper ads, 
and on its website. See, e.g., Pasquarelli, supra note 7; Lucinda Shen, Wells 
Fargo CEO Tim Sloan Just Apologized to His Employees, FORTUNE (Oct. 26, 
2016), http://fortune.com/2016/10/26/time-sloan-fargo-apology; Wells Fargo 
Hearing, supra note 6; The Latest We’re Doing to Build a Better Wells Fargo, 
WELLS FARGO, https://www.wellsfargo.com/commitment (last visited Feb. 2, 
2018). The apology and the underlying lack of admissions, however, garnered 
criticism. See, e.g., Gary Frisch, Why Wells Fargo’s Apology Wasn’t an Apology 
at All, EQUITIES.COM (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.equities.com/news/why 
-wells-fargo-s-apology-wasn-t-an-apology-at-all; Lucy Kellaway, Wells Fargo’s 
Wagonload of Insincere Regrets, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2016), https://www.ft 
.com/content/55ee4610-790e-11e6-97ae-647294649b28. 
 276. See HEARIT, supra note 249; Coombs, supra note 268, at 172; Gillespie 
& Dietz, supra note 250, at 140. 
 277. Coombs, supra note 268, at 172; see also W. Timothy Coombs, Choos-
ing the Right Words: The Development of Guidelines for the Selection of the 
“Appropriate” Crisis-Response Strategies, 8 MGMT. COMM. Q. 447, 466 (1995); 
W. Timothy Coombs & Sherry J. Holladay, Helping Crisis Managers Protect 
Reputational Assets: Initial Tests of the Situational Crisis Communication 
Theory, 16 MGMT. COMM. Q. 165, 172 (2002); see Liang Ma & Mengqi (Monica) 
Zhan, Effects of Attributed Responsibility and Response Strategies on Organi-
zational Reputation: A Meta-Analysis of Situational Crisis Communication 
Theory Research, 28 J. PUB. REL. RES. 102, 105 (2016). 
 278. Reinhard Bachmann et al., Repairing Trust in Organizations and In-
stitutions: Toward a Conceptual Framework, 36 ORG. STUD. 1123, 1125 (2015) 
(arguing that “restoring organizational trust first requires a process of sense-
making to establish a shared understanding or accepted account of what hap-
pened, how and why” and “also what needs to be reformed or changed to pre-
vent a future violation”); Gillespie & Dietz, supra note 250, at 133–35 (recom-
mending that the organization make “apologies and reparations (where 
appropriate),” engage in actions “designed to avoid and prevent future trust 
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deed, “taking responsibility for the consequences of its actions 
in the face of [legal, commercial, or shareholder pressure] 
strongly indicates an organization’s integrity and concern for 
those affected.”279 Acknowledging violations and accepting re-
sponsibility can also create the conditions that can lead to im-
provement in the relevant processes,280 and demonstrate a 
commitment to that improvement going forward.281 Thus, apol-
ogies have been associated with increased trust,282 improved 
reputation in the long term,283 and less anger.284 
C. NEGOTIATING ADMISSIONS 
When considering approaches to admissions, commentators 
and agencies tend to focus on the potential effects of policies 
such as no-admit-no-deny on litigation and litigation risks. As 
we have seen, to the extent that enforcement targets are reluc-
tant to make admissions in the face of collateral consequences, 
 
transgressions” and that “actively demonstrate ability, benevolence, and integ-
rity”); see also ROY J. LEWICKI & BARBARA BENEDICT BUNKER, DEVELOPING 
AND MAINTAINING TRUST IN WORK RELATIONSHIPS, in TRUST IN ORGANIZA-
TIONS: FRONTIERS OF THEORY AND RESEARCH 114, 124 (Roderick M. Kramer & 
Tom R. Tyler eds., 1996) (recommending a four-stage process for trust repair). 
 279. Gillespie & Dietz, supra note 250, at 140. 
 280. See, e.g., Fred Rosner et al., Disclosure and Prevention of Medical Er-
rors, 160 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2089, 2091 (2000) (explaining the connec-
tion between admitting and preventing errors). 
 281. Michael D. Pfarrer et al., After the Fall: Reintegrating the Corrupt Or-
ganization, 33 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 730, 738 (2008); see also Gillespie & Dietz, 
supra note 250, at 140 (arguing that “the sincerity of acknowledging direct re-
sponsibility (internal attribution) outweigh[s] the negative implications from 
conceded guilt. In contrast, alternative responses—excuses, reticence, or citing 
external attributions—will be viewed as deceptive and will therefore be less 
effective . . . .”); Edward C. Tomlinson & Roger C. Mayer, The Role of Causal 
Attribution Dimensions in Trust Repair, 34 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 85, 98 (2009) 
(noting that acknowledging responsibility “restore[s] trust or cooperation after 
a violation under certain circumstances”). 
 282. Tomlinson et al., supra note 273, at 181. For an example, see Nicole 
Gillespie et al., Organizational Reintegration and Trust Repair After an Integ-
rity Violation: A Case Study, 24 BUS. ETHICS Q. 371 (2014). 
 283. W. Timothy Coombs & Sherry J. Holladay, Comparing Apology to 
Equivalent Crisis Response Strategies: Clarifying Apology’s Role and Value in 
Crisis Communication, 34 PUB. REL. REV. 252, 255–56 (2008); Lisa Lyon & 
Glen T. Cameron, A Relational Approach Examining the Interplay of Prior 
Reputation and Immediate Response to a Crisis, 16 J. PUB. REL. RES. 213, 232 
(2004); Pace et al., supra note 222. 
 284. Suman Lee & Surin Chung, Corporate Apology and Crisis Communi-
cation: The Effect of Responsibility Admittance and Sympathetic Expression on 
Public’s Anger Relief, 38 PUB. REL. REV. 932, 933 (2012). 
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pushing for admissions may make settlement more difficult.285 
Insisting on admissions may mean that it takes longer to reach 
settlement and that more cases will go to trial.286 At the same 
time, however, obtaining admissions could also result in great-
er accountability, deterrence, and legitimacy through more set-
tlements that include admissions as well as via court rulings. 
Agency negotiators have to consider the potential for all of 
these consequences of seeking admissions, weighing them 
against each other in the creation of admissions policies and in 
negotiating individual cases.287 
Reluctance to make admissions also has consequences for 
enforcement targets. Litigation is not just costly and risky for 
the agency—it is also costly and risky for the targets of en-
forcement actions.288 In addition, litigation means ongoing pub-
licity and a public trial. Denial and silence may compound the 
reputational damage.289 Making admissions when the agency 
insists on them can be a way for targets to avoid those costs. 
Though targets may not want to make admissions, a credible 
threat of litigation should be a factor in targets’ analysis of the 
weighing of legal and public relations consequences. In the case 
of the SEC, the Agency has reported some success in obtaining 
admissions: 
  Many originally doubted our ability to implement this new ap-
proach. Some expressed concern that we would not be able to obtain 
admissions because defendants would be overly concerned about col-
lateral consequences. Others wondered whether our new policy would 
bog down settlements and cause more parties to go to trial. But these 
 
 285. See supra Part I.C (describing collateral consequences). 
 286. White, supra note 19 (“[B]ecause of our increased demands for admis-
sions, we recognize that we may see more financial firms that say: ‘We’ll see 
you in court.’”); White, supra note 220 (“[O]ur new approach could well lead to 
more trials by parties refusing to admit their wrongdoing.”). 
 287. See, e.g., Morgenson, supra note 18 (quoting SEC enforcement head 
Andrew Ceresney’s statement that “[h]eightened accountability or acceptance 
of responsibility through the defendant’s admission of misconduct may be ap-
propriate, even if it does not allow us to achieve a prompt resolution”). 
 288. Targets going to trial will incur the costs of mounting a defense. See, 
e.g., EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, LITIGATION COSTS IN CIVIL 
CASES: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD-
VISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 7 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. 2010) (analyzing liti-
gation costs); Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of 
Cost in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 770 (2010) (reporting medi-
an litigation costs); David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 
31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 77–78 (1983) (discussing factors that determine how 
much a party is willing to invest in litigation). They also risk losing at trial. 
 289. See supra Parts IV.B.1, IV.B.2 (discussing admission models that al-
low parties to deny or remain silent as to liability). 
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dire predictions have not materialized and we have been able to ob-
tain significant admissions in cases where we thought they were ap-
propriate.290 
In cases in which admissions cannot be obtained through 
settlement, public accountability might be achievable by taking 
the case to trial.291 Once an agency begins to insist on obtaining 
admissions and elicits them in some cases, particularly in 
prominent cases, and successfully takes cases to trial when 
such admissions are not forthcoming, the agency will have in-
creased credibility and leverage to build on those successes in 
future negotiations. The SEC has pointed to examples of inter-
action between insisting on admissions and trial. Its 2016 case 
against the City of Miami reportedly went to trial “primarily 
because the City would not accept admissions,” ultimately re-
sulting in a one million dollar penalty.292 Admissions may also 
alter the timing of settlement. SEC actions are often settled at 
the same time they are filed.293 Under the new admissions poli-
cy, however, some targets reportedly “balked at admissions 
during pre-filing settlement discussions.”294 After the Agency 
 
 290. Andrew Ceresney, Dir., Div. of Enf ’t, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Keynote 
Address at Compliance Week 2014 (May 20, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/ 
speech/2014-spch052014ajc; see also Morgenson, supra note 18 (“When the 
S.E.C. has demanded admissions, it says it usually gets them. If a defendant 
balks, the S.E.C. can respond with litigation.”). Similar experience has been 
reported in criminal plea bargaining. See Bibas, supra note 32, at 1379 (“What 
happens when the law forbids Alford and nolo pleas, judges refuse to allow 
them, or prosecutors refuse to enter them? Some of these cases go to trial, but 
many defendants eventually admit guilt . . . . Judges and counsel in states 
that forbid these pleas agreed that a majority of defendants who deny guilt at 
plea hearings eventually admit guilt when the only other option is to go to tri-
al.”). As we noted above, however, not all are satisfied with the frequency and 
types of cases in which admissions have been obtained. See supra notes 207–
16 and accompanying text (describing criticisms of the SEC). 
 291. See, e.g., White, supra note 220 (“More trials should mean greater 
public accountability and more instances of a full factual record of wrongdoing 
that should foster better development of the law.”). 
 292. White, A New Model, supra note 187. 
 293. CHOI ET AL., supra note 47, at 7. 
 294. White, A New Model, supra note 187 (citing Litigation Release, Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n, SEC Obtains Final Judgment Against Promoters of Pyramid 
Scheme Targeting Latino Communities (Sept. 19, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/ 
litigation/litreleases/2016/lr23647.htm; Litigation Release, Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, SEC Obtains Final Judgment Against Massachusetts-Based Promot-
er of Pyramid Scheme Targeting Latino Communities (May 27, 2016), http:// 
www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2016/lr23548.htm; Litigation Release, Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n, SEC Obtains Final Judgment Against Promoter of Pyramid 
Scheme Targeting Latino Communities (Sept. 17, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/ 
litigation/litreleases/2015/lr23351.htm; Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 
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filed the action, however, these targets ultimately agreed to 
settlements that included admissions.295 And the prospect of 
having to make admissions or go to trial may more effectively 
deter wrongdoing in the first place.296 
1. Admissions of Facts Versus Admissions of Legal Violations 
One decision that agencies must make is whether to simply 
elicit admissions about facts or to insist on admissions about 
legal violations. In the aftermath of wrongdoing, there is often 
a desire that transgressors take responsibility for their behav-
ior and for having caused harm.297 Indeed, the inclusion of re-
sponsibility-taking is what makes apologies unique among re-
medial responses298 and renders them particularly effective.299 
Accepting responsibility contributes significantly to the positive 
 
Wedbush Securities and Two Officials Agree to Settle SEC Case (Nov. 20, 
2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2014-263). 
 295. White, A New Model, supra note 187. 
 296. See supra note 228 and accompanying text (describing the deterrent 
effect of knowing that an admission will be required). 
 297. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Framing the Choice Between Cash and 
the Courthouse: Experiences with the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, 42 LAW 
& SOC’Y REV. 645, 661 (2008) (reporting that victims’ families wanted a trial so 
that the defendants could be held accountable for their decisions); Gerald B. 
Hickson et al., Factors that Prompted Families to File Medical Malpractice 
Claims Following Perinatal Injuries, 267 JAMA 1359, 1361 (1992) (noting that 
plaintiffs were motivated by a desire for transparency and accountability); 
Vincent et al., supra note 227, at 1612 (noting the same). 
 298. The acceptance of responsibility distinguishes apologies from other 
remedial responses such as denials, excuses, and justifications. See ERVING 
GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC: MICROSTUDIES OF THE PUBLIC ORDER 113 
(1971) (describing apologies as a “splitting of the self into a blameworthy part 
and a part that stands back and sympathizes with the blame giving”); TAVU-
CHIS, supra note 273, at 3 (describing the admission of fault as a minimum re-
quirement of apologies); Barry R. Schlenker & Michael F. Weigold, Interper-
sonal Processes Involving Impression Regulation and Management, 43 ANN. 
REV. PSYCHOL. 133, 162 (1992) (describing the social functions of apologies); 
Marvin B. Scott & Stanford M. Lyman, Accounts, 33 AM. SOC. REV. 46, 59 
(1968) (describing the same). 
 299. See, e.g., Pace et al., supra note 222, at 420 (describing benefits to 
company reputations); Robbennolt, Legal Settlement, supra note 25, at 486–89, 
495–97 (analyzing the effect of apologies on settlement negotiations); Robben-
nolt, Settlement Levers, supra note 25, at 359–65 (analyzing the same); Scher 
& Darley, supra note 230, at 134–36 (comparing the effectiveness of different 
types of apologies); Manfred Schmitt et al., Effects of Objective and Subjective 
Account Components on Forgiving, 144 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 465, 476 (2004) (ana-
lyzing how the objective components of a harm-doer ’s interaction with a victim 
affect the victim’s subjective perception of that interaction). 
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impacts of apology,300 though expressions of sympathy without 
a concomitant taking of responsibility can have positive, albeit 
smaller, effects as well.301 
Obtaining admissions of wrongdoing, guilt, or particular 
legal violations, then, might be particularly useful in signaling 
accountability to the public. Responsibility-taking might also 
further agencies’ interests in deterrence and minimizing mis-
conduct in the future.302 As such, these sorts of admissions may 
have important benefits in some cases. 
To the extent that targets are reluctant to take responsibil-
ity for particular wrongdoing,303 however, agencies may still 
benefit from eliciting factual admissions. In addition to respon-
sibility-taking, injured parties tend to value explanations of 
what has transpired.304 Claimants in tort cases, for example, 
 
 300. See, e.g., Lewicki et al., supra note 257, at 190 (finding that acknowl-
edgement of responsibility is an important component of an apology); sources 
cited supra note 299 and accompanying text. 
 301. Robbennolt, Settlement Levers, supra note 25, at 34 (finding that par-
tial apologies can have a positive impact); see also Jonathan R. Cohen, Advis-
ing Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009, 1048 (1999); Arie Nadler & 
Ido Liviatan, Intergroup Reconciliation: Effects of Adversary’s Expressions of 
Empathy, Responsibility, and Recipients’ Trust, 32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSY-
CHOL. BULL. 459, 463 (2006) (finding that those who heard expressions of 
sympathy perceived more acceptance of responsibility); Deborah L. Levi, Note, 
The Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1187–88 (1997) 
(concluding that partial apologies can be better than no apology at all). 
 302. See supra notes 229–36 and accompanying text (discussing the impact 
of apologies on perceptions about future behavior). 
 303. This reluctance may stem from concerns about collateral consequenc-
es. See supra Part I.C. (discussing collateral consequences). It may also be a 
result of a variety of other barriers to admitting wrongdoing. See generally 
CAROL TAVRIS & ELLIOT ARONSON, MISTAKES WERE MADE (BUT NOT BY ME): 
WHY WE JUSTIFY FOOLISH BELIEFS, BAD DECISIONS, AND HURTFUL ACTS 
(2007) (describing the difficulties that people face in acknowledging mistakes); 
Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Jean Sternlight, Behavioral Legal Ethics, 45 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 1107 (2013) (examining how it can be difficult to acknowledge unethi-
cal behavior). 
 304. See SUSAN F. HIRSCH, IN THE MOMENT OF GREATEST CALAMITY: TER-
RORISM, GRIEF, AND A VICTIM’S QUEST FOR JUSTICE 1–2 (2006) (describing de-
sire for information in the aftermath of the bombings of the U.S. embassies in 
Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania); Gallagher et al., supra note 
227, at 1005–06 (describing patients’ desire for information about medical er-
rors); Hadfield, supra note 297, at 670–71 (describing 9/11 victims’ desire for 
information); Hickson et al., supra note 297, at 1362 (describing a desire for 
information in the tort context); Lewicki et al., supra note 257, at 190 (identi-
fying “explanation” as an important component of an effective apology); Vin-
cent et al., supra note 227, at 1609 (describing a desire for information in the 
tort context); see also Rachel Abrams & Danielle Ivory, G.M. Secrecy on Crash-
es Adds to Families’ Pain, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2014), https://www.nytimes 
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sometimes file lawsuits to acquire information about how their 
injuries occurred,305 and are less likely to file claims when they 
receive information and explanations.306 Similarly, people often 
want apologies from offenders; such apologies are valued, in 
part, as providing an explanation about what happened307 and 
seem more adequate when they provide, and are based on, a 
shared factual understanding or “corroborated factual rec-
ord.”308 The provision of information can “convey respect for the 
victim and affirm his or her status. The very fact that the per-
petrator thinks that the victim is due an explanation signals 
respect for the victim and tends to diminish the victim’s an-
ger.”309 Thus the provision of information and explanations can 
be a valuable part of the admissions elicited by an agency, even 
in the absence of the taking of responsibility or admissions of 
specific legal violations.310 
Consider, as an example, medical “communication-and-
resolution programs” that work to provide information to pa-
 
.com/2014/04/03/business/barriers-wall-off-the-facts-of-gm-car-crashes.html 
(describing victims’ desire for information). 
 305. See, e.g., Hickson et al., supra note 297; Vincent et al., supra note 227; 
see also Hadfield, supra note 297. Claimants in medical malpractice lawsuits, 
for example, often assert that they filed suit to get information about what 
happened to them. Once they obtain that information, many claimants drop 
their claims. Cf. Dwight Golann, Dropped Medical Malpractice Claims: Their 
Surprising Frequency, Apparent Causes, And Potential Remedies, 30 HEALTH 
AFF. 1343, 1345–47 (2011) (concluding that many plaintiffs drop their claims 
as they acquire additional information). 
 306. See E. Allan Lind et al., The Winding Road from Employee to Com-
plainant: Situational and Psychological Determinants of Wrongful-
Termination Claims, 45 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 557, 576 (2000) (finding that employ-
ees who receive explanations for adverse employment decisions are less likely 
to file claims against their employers); Frank A. Sloan & Chee Ruey Hsieh, 
Injury, Liability, and the Decision To File a Medical Malpractice Claim, 29 L. 
& SOC’Y REV. 413, 427 (1995) (finding that patients who are promptly provided 
with information about their medical care, any problems, and their condition, 
are less likely to file lawsuits). See generally John C. Shaw et al., To Justify or 
Excuse?: A Meta-Analytic Review of the Effects of Explanations, 88 J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 444 (2003) (reporting a meta-analysis finding that explanations in-
fluence justice perceptions). 
 307. See, e.g., Gallagher et al., supra note 227, at 1006 (describing a desire 
for information by medical malpractice claimants). 
 308. SMITH, supra note 273, at 28–33 (describing the importance of an 
agreed-upon set of facts for an effective apology). 
 309. Dale T. Miller, Disrespect and the Experience of Injustice, 52 ANN. 
REV. PSYCHOL. 527, 537 (2001). 
 310. See generally Lesley Wexler & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Designing 
Amends for Lawful Civilian Casualties, 42 YALE J. INT’L L. 121, 155–56 (2017) 
(discussing the role of explanations in making amends for civilian casualties in 
armed conflict). 
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tients who experience negative outcomes or injuries during 
their medical care.311 When a patient is injured, an investiga-
tion is conducted. If the investigation uncovers an error, infor-
mation about the error is disclosed to the patient or the pa-
tient’s family and attempts to settle the case are made.312 If, 
instead, the investigation finds no error, no settlement or ad-
mission of error is made, but information about the investiga-
tion and its findings are still provided to the patient.313 
2. Admissions of State of Mind 
We saw above that information about the target’s state of 
mind can be one element of the facts of a case, one that can 
have important implications for determining whether there has 
been a particular legal violation. While some claims will re-
quire only proof of negligence, other claims will require proof of 
scienter.314 Targets, therefore, may resist making admissions 
that confirm intentionality or recklessness, out of concern for 
the potential collateral consequences they may face.315 
Audiences for admissions, however, may value factual in-
formation about the state of mind of the offender. In writing 
about the importance of establishing a shared factual under-
standing of a transgression, philosopher Nick Smith notes that 
“the offender’s mental states at the time of the offense will of-
ten amount to significant facts” that are important to clarify as 
part of a “thorough factual account.”316 This is so, at least in 
 
 311. See generally Richard C. Boothman et al., A Better Approach to Medi-
cal Malpractice Claims? The University of Michigan Experience, 2 J. HEALTH 
& LIFE SCI. L. 125 (2009) (describing error disclosure program at the Universi-
ty of Michigan); Kachalia et al., supra note 271 (same); Michelle M. Mello et 
al., Communication-and-Resolution Programs: The Challenges and Lessons 
Learned From Six Early Adopters, 33 HEALTH AFF. 20 (2014) (examining 
communication-and-resolution programs at six different organizations). 
 312. See sources cited supra note 311. 
 313. Id. 
 314. See supra notes 148–50 and accompanying text (describing state of 
mind requirements in securities litigation). 
 315. See supra Part I.C. (describing collateral consequences). 
 316. SMITH, supra note 273, at 29; id. at 50 (“[T]he mental state of the of-
fender before and at the time of the offense holds significance not only because 
it bears on her moral responsibility, but also because it fills in important de-
tails about the factual record. The offender ’s mental states can provide some 
of the most important historical facts that a victim seeks to understand, and in 
this respect the analysis of the offender ’s mind can be an important compo-
nent of corroborating the historical record . . . .”); see also NICK SMITH, JUS-
TICE THROUGH APOLOGIES: REMORSE, REFORM, AND PUNISHMENT 264–65 
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part, because information about state of mind influences per-
ceptions of and attributions about harm. Perceptions of inten-
tionality, for example, are a key factor in people’s attributions 
of blame and culpability.317 
The effects of admitting state of mind or making apologies 
for conduct that is perceived to have been intentional have been 
less frequently studied empirically. We do know that when in-
jured persons perceive harm as having been intentionally in-
flicted, they tend to perceive that harm as more severe, be an-
grier, and be less likely to forgive the offender.318 But, 
importantly, they are also more likely to desire an apology 
when the harm is viewed as having been intentionally inflict-
ed.319 Offenders, on the other hand, tend to be less inclined to-
ward apologizing for intentional behavior.320 And apologies 
made in the face of intentional wrongdoing may face hurdles as 
compared to those given in response to unintentional harmdo-
ing.321 
Given the greater disinclination to apologize for intentional 
conduct and the greater potential for negative collateral conse-
quences for offenses involving scienter, agencies should expect 
that targets will be more resistant to making admissions relat-
ed to state of mind and scienter than they will with regard to 
other facts. Agencies will have to decide in particular cases how 
important such admissions are to their overall goals. In some 
 
(2014) [hereinafter SMITH, JUSTICE THROUGH APOLOGIES] (explaining the im-
portance of mental states in establishing a factual record). 
 317. See JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & VALERIE P. HANS, THE PSYCHOLOGY 
OF TORT LAW 34–37 (2016) (discussing the roles of intent in tort liability); 
John M. Darley & Thane S. Pitman, The Psychology of Compensatory and Re-
tributive Justice, 7 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 324, 327 (2003) (de-
scribing how perceptions of intentionality influence decisions about legal 
judgments). 
 318. See, e.g., Daniel L. Ames & Susan T. Fiske, Intentional Harms Are 
Worse, Even When They’re Not, 24 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1755, 1756 (2013); John M. 
Darley & Charles W. Huff, Heightened Damage Assessment as a Result of the 
Intentionality of the Damage-Causing Act, 29 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 181 
(1990); Kurt Gray & Daniel M. Wegner, The Sting of Intentional Pain, 19 PSY-
CHOL. SCI. 1260, 1260 (2008); Joost M. Leunissen et al., The Apology Mis-
match: Asymmetries Between Victim’s Need for Apologies and Perpetrator ’s 
Willingness to Apologize, 49 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 315, 316–17 
(2013) (exploring how intentionality influences judgments). 
 319. Leunissen et al., supra note 318. 
 320. Id. 
 321. See, e.g., C. Ward Struthers et al., The Effects of Attributions of Intent 
and Apology on Forgiveness: When Saying Sorry May Not Help the Story, 44 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 983, 990–91 (2008) (exploring the challenges 
for apologies following an intentional wrong). 
 2018] ADMISSIONS OF GUILT 1141 
 
instances, obtaining admissions of basic (non-state of mind) 
facts may be better than nothing; in other cases, the agency’s 
goals might be better served by expecting more. 
3. Agency Evidence of Target Wrongdoing 
Cases, and allegations within cases, will fall on a spectrum 
in terms of the clarity of the available evidence that supports 
the allegations. Some allegations will be supported by more 
clear evidence than others.322 Thus it may be appropriate to 
negotiate a set of admissions that admit to certain facts or vio-
lations, but not others. 
  If the putative injurer is unsure of what happened, let him first 
investigate. If, following such investigation, he concludes that he is 
clearly responsible for one piece but unsure about some other piece, 
then let him at least take responsibility for the first piece . . . . [I]t will 
help to focus subsequent discussions and possible legal proceedings on 
what they properly should be focused, namely, on issues of fact and 
law where there is genuine dispute.323 
Targets, of course, may be less willing to admit to allega-
tions that are less clearly established. But the potential conse-
quences of admissions for targets facing less well-supported al-
legations may vary as well. For example, research has found 
that apologies, particularly apologies that admit responsibility, 
may be most needed and effective when the evidence of the de-
fendant’s fault is relatively clear.324 Indeed, failing to take re-
sponsibility in the face of clear evidence of wrongdoing “can be 
worse than saying nothing at all. It’s insulting to merely ex-
press sympathy or benevolence when you should be admitting 
 
 322. Cohen, supra note 235, at 920 (contrasting complex cases in which 
fault is ambiguous and not easily established with cases in which “injurers do 
know that they are at fault for what they have done”). 
 323. Id. at 952. This may result in “carefully crafted” admissions that are 
designed to minimize the collateral consequences. See, e.g., ElBoghdady & 
Douglas, supra note 246 (describing a factual admission designed to minimize 
future liability). The notion of carefully crafted admissions has parallels to the 
discussion of “safe apologies” in the apologies literature. See, e.g., Cohen, su-
pra note 301, at 1067–68; Lee Taft, Essay, Apology Subverted: The Commodi-
fication of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135, 1153–54 n.94 (2000) (criticizing laws 
that exclude apologies from evidence at trial); Robbennolt, Legal Settlement, 
supra note 25, at 473–74 (describing the debate over safe apologies). 
 324. Robbennolt, Settlement Levers, supra note 25, at 360–62 (exploring the 
effects of defendant’s fault on perceptions of an apology); see also Robbennolt, 
Legal Settlement, supra note 25, at 494–95 (finding that apologies that do not 
include acceptance of responsibility can negatively impact victim perceptions 
when there is clear evidence of fault). 
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your fault.”325 It is in these situations, in particular, that specif-
ic admissions—rather than mere platitudes—may be the most 
necessary. This suggests that admissions may hold the most 
potential benefit for targets when their litigation prospects are 
the weakest and the additional or marginal risks posed by 
making admissions are relatively low given the independent ev-
idence of the transgression.326 
In contrast, research has found that taking responsibility 
is less clearly helpful to transgressors when the facts are am-
biguous.327 Correspondingly, the liability risks in such circum-
stances are greater. Thus, it would not be surprising if it were 
more difficult for the agency to obtain admissions in such cases. 
Consider the SEC’s evolving admissions policy in this re-
gard. The first cases in which the SEC decided to depart from 
its no-admit-no-deny approach were those cases in which the 
target had made admissions in settling a criminal case or had 
been convicted in a criminal action based on the same underly-
ing facts.328 These are likely to be cases in which the evidence 
for the allegations is relatively compelling and the public desire 
for admissions is particularly strong. 
4. Negotiated Admissions 
Crisis communication experts advise quick and voluntary 
admissions in the wake of problems.329 Because admissions in 
the administrative enforcement context come as part of a nego-
tiated settlement, critics might reasonably ask whether the fact 
that an admission or apology comes as part of a negotiated set-
tlement with the agency diminishes its credibility and effec-
 
 325. Jonathan R. Cohen, Legislating Apology: The Pros and Cons, 70 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 819, 838 (2002); see also Robbennolt, Legal Settlement, supra note 
25, at 497–98 (finding that when an offender failed to take responsibility in an 
apology for a severe injury in the face of strong evidence of responsibility, ob-
servers tended to attribute more responsibility to the offender and saw the of-
fender as less likely to be careful in the future). 
 326. Robbennolt, Settlement Levers, supra note 25, at 369; see also Cohen, 
supra note 301, at 1028–29 (“Where one’s culpability can readily be proved by 
independent evidence other than an apology, admitting one’s fault when mak-
ing an apology will also have little impact on the plaintiff ’s ability to prove his 
case, for he already can.”). 
 327. Robbennolt, Settlement Levers, supra note 25, at 369. 
 328. See supra notes 181–84 and accompanying text (describing the origins 
of the SEC policy requiring admissions). 
 329. See, e.g., Gillespie & Dietz, supra note 250, at 139–40 (recommending 
a timely diagnosis of fault and a corresponding apology); Pfarrer et al., supra 
note 281, at 730 (proposing a four-stage model for organizational response to a 
transgression). 
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tiveness.330 Research has found, however, that negotiated apol-
ogies can be as effective as apologies that are spontaneous.331 
In the same vein, research has found that apologies given by 
attorneys on behalf of clients during negotiation have beneficial 
effects, though apologies given by attorneys tend not to be as 
effective as apologies given directly by the transgressor.332 
Thus, in a world in which an enforcement target has not al-
ready made admissions and apologized, doing so as part of or 
simultaneously with the settlement may still be effective. 
* * * * * 
This Part has examined what existing empirical research 
tells us about the potential effects of admissions on assess-
ments of accountability, deterrence, perceptions of agency legit-
imacy, target reputation, and negotiation dynamics. It is not 
our purpose to make a normative argument that the value of 
admissions for accountability, deterrence, or agency legitimacy 
should take precedence over other considerations or other ways 
to achieve those goals. Instead, we more precisely articulate 
what is communicated by admissions, denials, and silence, and 
the potential effects of these responses, so that regulators and 
litigants are better able to weigh the costs and benefits of ad-
missions and tailor admissions to the particular administrative 
context. 
With these caveats in mind, however, the existing empiri-
cal literature on blame, acknowledgement, claiming, the attrib-
 
 330. For a discussion of compelled, coerced, and requested apologies, see 
SMITH, JUSTICE THROUGH APOLOGIES, supra note 316, at 51–93; Robyn Car-
roll, You Can’t Order Sorriness, So Is There Any Value in an Ordered Apology? 
An Analysis of Ordered Apologies in Anti-Discrimination Cases, 33 U.N.S.W. 
L.J. 360 (2010); Jane L. Risen & Thomas Gilovich, Target and Observer Differ-
ences in the Acceptance of Questionable Apologies, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 418, 421 (2007) (exploring reactions to pressured apologies); Jen-
nifer K. Robbennolt, The Effects of Negotiated and Delegated Apologies in Set-
tlement Negotiation, 37 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 128, 133 (2013) (exploring reac-
tions to requested apologies); Alana Saulnier & Diane Sivasubramaniam, 
Effects of Victim Presence and Coercion in Restorative Justice: An Experi-
mental Paradigm, 39 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 378, 385 (2015) (finding that coer-
cion has “clear and robust negative effects on the quality of apologies”); Carl D. 
Schneider, What It Means to Be Sorry: The Power of Apology in Mediation, 17 
MEDIATION Q. 265, 277 (2000) (advocating apology by civil defendants in me-
diation); Brent T. White, Say You’re Sorry: Court-Ordered Apologies as a Civil 
Rights Remedy, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1261 (2006) (advocating court-ordered 
apologies in civil rights cases with government defendants). 
 331. Robbennolt, supra note 330. 
 332. Id. 
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ution of responsibility, and apologies has a number of implica-
tions that should be of particular interest to targets and agen-
cies. Our examination of this literature has also identified a 
number of interesting empirical questions that arise in this 
context. 
First, facts and explanation matter. It is not enough to say, 
as some critics have, that factual admissions are the weakest 
type of admission.333 Studies in other contexts suggest that in-
formation and explanations have value in themselves and that 
creating “a public record of the conduct”334 can help to further 
regulatory goals. Our review of the empirical literature also 
suggests where more nuanced research is needed. For example, 
research is needed to explore the effects of detailed factual alle-
gations, particularly where those factual allegations are explic-
itly neither admitted nor denied;335 whether explicit non-denial 
of those detailed facts is similar to or different from silence;336 
and the extent to which explicit factual admissions change per-
ceptions.337 
Second, targets of enforcement activity do and should have 
more complicated relationships with admissions than a narrow 
focus on the particular matter and related short-term litigation 
risks would suggest. Targets have to weigh the reputational 
damage of refusing a settlement that requires admissions. Liti-
gation has its own publicity and potential for reputational 
damage to consider. Admissions will also have multiple audi-
ences. Particularly for legal entities such as corporations, ad-
missions may have internal functions, signaling to employees 
and other internal audiences something about the organiza-
tion’s trustworthiness and intentions.338 Admissions may also 
have an external function, sending signals to various external 
audiences, including the public, consumers, and regulators. 
Moreover, thinking more precisely about the effects of admis-
 
 333. Letter from Elizabeth Warren, supra note 207, at 6 (quoting Stephen 
Gandel, Did the SEC Let JPMorgan Off the Hook?, FORTUNE (Sept. 20, 2013), 
http://fortune.com/2013/09/20/did-the-sec-let-jpmorgan-off-the-hook). 
 334. White, supra note 220 (noting that requiring admissions “creates a 
public record of the conduct at issue and demonstrates unequivocally the de-
fendant’s acceptance of responsibility for his or her acts”). 
 335. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 336. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 337. See supra Part IV.A.3. 
 338. See Bachmann et al., supra note 278, at 1136 (noting both internal 
and external audiences); Gillespie & Dietz, supra note 250, at 142 (focusing, in 
particular, on employees). 
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sion, silence, and denial and thinking in a more nuanced way 
about the content of admissions gives targets and agencies a 
range of options that may be useful in accomplishing their 
goals in particular cases. Finally, targets must consider how 
the meaning of admissions may be amplified or modified by 
other communications, such as apologies. 
Third, although it may seem that targets of agency en-
forcement will always want to deny facts or responsibility, de-
nial, or even silence, will sometimes be a bad choice for targets. 
This may be particularly true when a target of civil enforce-
ment has already pled guilty to a crime based on the same con-
duct. Similarly, in the context of a broader settlement with 
multiple agencies, it may be that once the target has made ad-
missions in one instance, it is better off in terms of public repu-
tation if it makes admissions—and, perhaps, takes other reme-
dial steps—in other settlements as well. Remaining silent or 
making overt denials, particularly in the face of admissions 
elsewhere, of the exact facts at issue, may unnecessarily com-
plicate negotiations with the agency and hurt the target’s cred-
ibility, in addition to creating legitimacy problems for the agen-
cy.339 
  CONCLUSION   
Should agencies require admissions of wrongdoing from the 
targets of civil enforcement? In this Article we step beyond a 
narrow focus on the SEC and other financial regulators and put 
the policy decision about whether to require admissions into 
the broader administrative context. Moreover, we step beyond a 
simple discussion of admissions and provide a more nuanced 
account of what it means to make and require admissions. We 
draw on empirical studies of blame, acknowledgement, claim-
ing, the attribution of responsibility, and apologies to shed light 
on the function and potential value of admissions by targets of 
civil enforcement. 
The failure of the SEC and other financial regulators to re-
quire admissions of wrongdoing has garnered the spotlight on 
this issue, triggering cries of rigged justice and calls for greater 
public accountability. Even the former chair of the SEC has 
 
 339. More systematic research on the effects of failure to obtain admissions 
on perceptions of agency legitimacy would be informative. See generally Bibas, 
supra note 32, at 1386 (“Alford and nolo contendere pleas send mixed messag-
es, breeding public doubt, uncertainty, and lack of respect for the criminal jus-
tice system.”). 
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said, “[T]here is nothing quite like a company or corporate ex-
ecutive who violated the securities laws openly and publicly 
admitting their guilt.”340 Judges and legislators have piled on, 
as exemplified by Judge Rakoff’s vocal critique in the Citigroup 
case and the 2012 Congressional hearings on financial agencies’ 
settlement practices.341 This public pressure on the admissions 
policies of financial regulators is understandable, particularly 
in the long aftermath of a financial crisis. The SEC is a particu-
larly useful example for thinking about admissions in civil en-
forcement, as the public debate forced explicit discussion of the 
role of settlement and consideration of whether and when en-
forcement targets should admit wrongdoing. 
The SEC and other financial regulators, however, are only 
the tip of the iceberg. The SEC’s no-admit-no-deny policy is vis-
ible above water and salient in certain recent moments when it 
looks like it is directly in our path. But many of this Article’s 
examples are of settlements with agencies outside the financial 
sector, including the EPA, FTC, DOE, FCC, and the DOJ’s Civil 
Division. Settlement—ordinarily occurring without admissions 
and sometimes even with explicit denials—is the engine for 
much of administrative enforcement. Accordingly, policy choic-
es about how to manage the interactions between admissions 
and settlement implicate one of the main mechanisms of ad-
ministrative enforcement. 
The stakes are also high because the choice of admissions 
policy goes to the heart of the nature of civil enforcement. Civil 
enforcement by administrative agencies operates at the inter-
section of two sets of norms: the criminal law enforcement 
model, in which admissions are generally required; and the 
private settlement model, in which disclaimers of liability are 
an ordinary part of settlements between private parties. Poli-
cies about whether to require admissions sit uneasily at this in-
tersection. Which agencies and which cases provoke calls for 
targets to admit wrongdoing may turn in part on their per-
ceived relationship to these two poles. 
 
 340. White, supra note 132. 
 341. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011), vacated, 752 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 2014); Hearing on Settlement Practices, 
supra note 33. 
